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GUILT AS CONCEPTUALIZED BY O. HOBART MOWRER,
IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE

BY



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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance a thesis entitled "Guilt as Conceptualized by O. Hobart Mowrer, in its Psychological and Theological Perspective" submitted by Robert Drysdale Bell in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to examine the concepts of O. Hobart Mowrer concerning the nature of guilt. The approach taken was descriptive and analytic. The concern was with his internal consistency. His views were compared with those of other contemporary psychologists both secular and sacred, who are also interested in guilt. An attempt was made to understand the factors involved in the maturing of Mowrer's ideas. These include personal, Biblical and theological, as well as, more strictly psychological and empirical factors.

Particular attention was given to the implications for psychology and religion. To what extent are these complementary or opposed? Can they be integrated, and what, if any, contribution does Mowrer make to their integration?

It has been argued that guilt is where psychology and religion meet. Mowrer commits himself to the "ultimate unity of psychology and religion". His views have serious implications for both disciplines. These implications were examined.

Live issues for him are sin, repentance, confession and restitution. This study attempts to clarify his use of these terms and draw conclusions about their relevance to the therapeutic process.

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The topic enabled the writer to combine the theological and psychological as he sees them coming together on the issue of guilt. For the freedom to do this he is particularly grateful.

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CHAPTER I

THE IMPORTANCE OF GUILT: SOME VIEWS ON ITS NATURE AND CAUSE

THE IMPORTANCE OF GUILT

Sigmund Freud insisted that "the sense of guilt" was the most important issue facing civilization (Freud, 1930, p. 123). Viktor Frankl places guilt alongside suffering and death as "the tragic triad of human existence" (Frankl, 1967, p. 15). O. Hobart Mowrer regards it as "the central problem" in emotional disturbance (Mowrer, 1961, p. 56). There can therefore be little doubt about its importance and relevance in the eyes of these and others. But what is guilt? When we seek answers to that question agreement vanishes.

It would seem easy to agree with Meehl that "to feel guilty and to be guilty are obviously not the same thing" (Meehl, 1958, p. 152). Yet the question even in agreeing arises whether one ever feels guilty without being guilty. Rogers is no doubt correct in labelling his clients with "deep guilt feelings" (Mowrer, 1953, p. 568). But are his guilt feelings just that or does he feel guilty because he is guilty? Rollo May argues for the necessity to distinguish "neurotic guilt feelings from real guilt feelings" (Mowrer, 1953, p. 42). He describes the latter as objective and constructive. Does May mean

that neurotic guilt feelings have no objective basis, and are not constructive?

The issue is complicated by the almost bewildering number of terms used and by the way in which the topic of guilt touches religious ideas as well as psychological. David Belgum regards guilt as the place where psychology and religion meet. It is certainly difficult to discuss it without involving both disciplines. Freud maintained that Christianity was responsible for the "primal sense of guilt" being acquired (Freud, 1930, p. 126).

Among the terms used are valid guilt, objective guilt, real guilt, neurotic guilt, displaced guilt and unconscious guilt. By unconscious guilt is meant that the person has repressed an incestuous or aggressive wish, for which he feels guilty (Meehl, 1958, p. 231). By displaced guilt is usually meant that the guilt feelings center around something other than the real cause of the guilt feelings. The feeling is detached from the original cause. Valid, real or objective guilt are subject to a variety of interpretations, theological and psychological. They have as the underlying conviction that the individual feels guilty because he is guilty. He has committed a transgression, done something wrong, or offended significant others.

The expression "neurotic guilt feelings" is difficult to expound because there is no agreement about what it is or

about its causes or cures. Some psychologists maintain that many people have neurotic guilt feelings when they should not have them. Meehl quotes the comment of a person he describes as a "secular psychologist":

The trouble with most neurotics is that they actually feel guilty about quite other things than the ones they should feel guilty about (Meehl, 1958, p. 153).

Mowrer would largely disagree. He believes that behind all neurotic guilt feelings are real offences. Any other feelings of guilt arising from any other cause will not in his view become a serious problem to the individual concerned. Another definition is that it is "unaccepted and repressed normal guilt" (Brammer, 1960, p. 406). This comes closer to Mowrer.

The debate is largely concerned with the issue of real or valid guilt. What happens to an individual when he commits acts that are disapproved of by significant others, and are a breach of contract, and are unacknowledged and unconfessed. It is to the issue of real guilt that O. Hobart Mowrer, in particular, addresses himself, and this is the concern of the present study. Assuming there is a condition that approximates to this, whether it be Brammer's neurotic guilt, or Mowrer's guilt, or real or valid guilt, the issues are: how significant is it? What are its dynamics? How does Mowrer, in particular, handle it?

REACTIONS TO MOWRER'S VIEWPOINT

In turning to Mowrer it is to be noted he provokes considerable hostility. Is this a function of his own method of expressing himself? Or is it a function of the ambivalence others exhibit when dealing with the issue of guilt? He is not inclined to speak gently.

The Calvinistic doctrine of the guilt of man and the grace of God (or what Tillich has called the Protestant Principle) has been a heresy which has produced despair, anger and madness (Mowrer, 1961, p. 171).

He does not scruple to describe Freud as "demonic" and maintains that the hidden motivation for his position was to obtain revenge on Christianity. He let no opportunity pass for striking at what was not only a personal affront but also as he conceived it "the enemy of all mankind" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 112).

It is argued that the strong reaction to him is what is to be expected from a radically new approach. Perry London suggests that "one useful index of the seminal quality of a new theory would be the extent to which it is publicly reviled" (London, 1964, p. 134).

If this is so it is certain that Mowrer's theory deserves "more serious attention than any such theory since Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis, for in the two generations that lie between them, no other mental health theorist has been subjected to such voluble and vituperative criticism" (London, 1964, p. 134).

The Editor of Pastoral Psychology writes of accepting a particular article "in spite of the fact that its constructive discussion is based on a discriminating appraisal of the views of O. Hobart Mowrer." He continues, "Over the past years we have rejected more than one article about Mowrer. Those submitted have been either 'uncritical adulation or throat cutting attack'." (Pastoral Psychology, 1965, p. 5). He goes on to discuss a particular case of Mowrer's: "A sexual illustration, and in Mowrer's writings, it is hard to find any other kind." This incidentally is hardly true and anyway what is being implied? Professor Seward Hiltner goes on to a brief discussion of Protestant sexual ethics and makes the surprising comment, "Perhaps, at least at this point, and with all his romantic ambiguities, Hugh Hefner is more Christian than either the tradition or Mowrer" (Pastoral Psychology, October 1965, p. 5.8).

Edward V. Stein is committed to the importance to man of an understanding of his guilt. "If there is any way out of man's inhumanity towards man, it will be through an understanding of, and ability to influence favourably his guilt, self-esteem system" (Stein, 1968, p. 6). He agrees that "Freud admitted the relevance (though he did not emphasize the importance) of real guilt" (Stein, 1968, p. 143). In spite of this Stein makes only the mildest of comments about Freud and yet strongly attacks Mowrer. He

acknowledges,

It is the author's conviction that Mowrer has made a major contribution to psychology and psychotherapy in forcing consideration of the importance of values and of real guilt (remorse) in human behaviour, normal and pathological (Stein, 1968, p. 140).

He goes on to imply that Mowrer is both mistaken and sadistic.

Mowrer would burden the already burdened sinful neurotic with the conviction not only that he is wrong in having violated some genuinely held value but that he is as worthless and despicable and worthy of self hate as he feels he is (Stein, 1968, p. 144).

It is exceedingly difficult to understand him characterizing a therapist who produces this for therapy as making a "major contribution".

This kind of ambivalence is not uncommon. In "Man's Search for Himself," Rollo May reviews the symptoms of disturbance. He maintains that in Freud's day they were focusing on the sexual and conflict with society. In Otto Frank's generation it centered in feelings of inferiority, inadequacy and guilt. Karen Horney followed with the analysis of "hostility between individuals and groups". He concludes that in our day "the chief problem of people in the middle decade of the Twentieth Century is emptiness (May, 1953, p. 25). He continues by focusing beyond sexual conflict to what he believes to be the cause -- "sex for too many people is an empty, mechanical and vacuous experience" (May, 1953, p. 25). He regards anxiety and loneliness

as even more at the core of the difficulty. Yet having written so extensively in this vein he makes the surprising statement, "the crucial psychological battle we must wage is that against our own dependent needs and our anxiety and guilt feelings which will arise as we move toward freedom" (May, 1953, p. 119).

This ambivalence shown by Rollo May is exhibited by others who share his general viewpoint and belong to the "third force" in psychology. Jourard makes the point that "'normal', self-alienated man, however, often ignores his 'tilt' signals -- anxiety, guilt, fatigue, boredom, pain or frustration -- and continues actions aimed at wealth, power, or normality until the machine stops" (Jourard, 1964, p. 101-2). He goes on to use Mowrer as an endorsement of his total position. "He (i.e. Mowrer) is convinced that the mentally ill -- neurotic and psychotic -- have developed their array of symptoms, at least in part, because of a duplicitous way of life" (Jourard, 1964, p. 102). This is certainly one thing that can be inferred from Mowrer but it is far from being the main point that he is making. The main problem for Mowrer is not so much lack of transparency as deviant behaviour.

The hypothesis is set forth that the condition commonly known as "neurosis" is one in which a human being has engaged in deviant behaviour (involving either sins of omission or sins of commission) and has then tried to hide the fact of his deviance by deception. Here deception is called a secondary avoidance response, which is designed to forestall punishment of the individual for deviant behaviour (Mowrer, 1967, p. 19).

What Jourard appears to be doing is acknowledging that guilt is a signal of disorder and that the cure is transparency or self-disclosure. "What, after all, is the situation called psychotherapy, but a situation wherein one person, the patient -- alienated from himself, troubled -- starts to disclose his real self to the other person, the therapist" (Jourard, 1964, p. 11). Self-disclosure is the key to mental health. He then uses Mowrer in support of this position ignoring the fact that to Mowrer it is not the key to emotional well being. In so doing he largely side steps the issue of guilt. Not so Mowrer. "Guilt . . . is the central problem -- not just guilt feelings as Freud so beguilingly suggested, but real, palpable, indisputable guilt" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 56).

The kind of feelings that Mowrer induces can be illustrated further from Albert Ellis's reply to Mowrer's article on "Some Constructive Features of the Concept of Sin" (Mowrer, 1960, p. 188). Ellis' concluding comment is that "The concept of sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbances. The sooner psychotherapists forthrightly begin to attack it the better their patients will be" (Ellis, 1960, p. 192). He regards "feelings of worthlessness" as the essence of human disturbance (Ellis, 1960, p. 190). In response to Mowrer's assertion that "the therapeutic programs of the future . . . will . . . take, guilt, confession and expiation seriously"

(Mowrer, 1960, p. 188), Ellis argues "there is no place whatever for the concept of sin in psychotherapy and that to introduce this concept in any manner, shape or form is highly pernicious and anti-therapeutic . . . no human being should ever be blamed for anything he does" (Ellis, 1960, p. 189). He is convinced "that giving anyone a sense of sin, guilt, or self blame is the worst possible way to help him be an emotionally sound and adequately socialized individual" (Ellis, 1960, p. 192).

In a sense Ellis takes the problems of sin and guilt very seriously. The vehemence with which he attacks the concepts surely indicates the seriousness with which he regards them. They are highly significant. The disagreement with Mowrer is not over their reality but their validity and the appropriate therapy. In this sense Mowrer may very well have the better consistency. Ellis appears to be reverting to the Freudian position of trying to persuade the patient that he does not have any reason to feel guilty when the patient is convinced that he has. Might it not be true as Mowrer asserts that it would save a great deal of time and be much more therapeutic to provide the patient with a more immediate and effective method of dealing with guilt -- such as confession and expiation?

THE CONNECTION WITH LEARNING THEORY

Mowrer was at first reluctant to tie in his own ideas on sin and guilt with learning theory. He has made a considerable contribution to learning theory. Is his position then a function of his learning theory? There is a carry over but hardly a causal connection.

Recently it has repeatedly been suggested that an attempt be made to restate the tenets of Integrity Therapy in the language of learning theory. For a variety of reasons, I personally, have been reluctant to do this.... However, as evidence in support of the I.T. conception of "neurosis" has grown, it has become increasingly feasible to recast it in learning theory terms (Mowrer, 1967, p. 25).

He uses learning theory to attack the Freudian notion that "early experiences" strongly affect adult personality. This is to him contrary to the position established by animal experimentation that all fears move toward extinction. He nails this argument down with the comment, "So it would appear that psychoanalytic premises are not only too simple, they are basically unsound, in a way which no amount of proliferation or apology will remedy" (Mowrer, 1960, p. 407).

Mowrer is highly respected in the field of learning theory. His position has gone through a period of considerable development. He began by seeking to integrate Conditioning (Pavlov) and Habit Formation (Thorndike). This he did by means of postulating Sign Learning (fear conditioning) and Solution Learning (habit formation).

For Mowrer this --

"Showed that avoidance behaviour, to be adequately explained, must involve both 'sign learning' and 'solution learning'" (Mowrer, 1960, p. 213).

However there were shortcomings in this approach. It did not deal adequately with "secondary reinforcement" nor did it deal with "the concept of habit".

This led him to a new version of the Two-Factor Theory. The two factors now concerned two types of reinforcement, rather than two types of learning. These were INCREMENTAL (punishment) and DECREMENTAL (reward). The first tends to increase drive by the application of secondary punishment of two types, Fear and Disappointment. The second tends to decrease drive by the application of secondary reward of two types, Relief and Hope. All learning is therefore in this view, conditioning, and may involve primary drive or either of two forms of secondary drive. All learning is thus mediated by the four reinforcers of hope and its opposite, fear, and by relief and its opposite, disappointment.

This enabled him to give a more adequate explanation for those things early learning theory treated inadequately, e.g. response variability (Pavlov) "foresightful" behaviour (Thorndike) and the two aspects he regarded as missing in all the early theories, avoidance learning and secondary reinforcement.

Using this model, Perry London traces the following steps in the guilt learning sequence. He is attempting to systematize what Mowrer believes takes place.

(1) Positive action of drive reduction to primary and secondary impulses in a context where the subject has previously learned to inhibit such action. In other words, yielding to the temptation to satisfy an impulse previously inhibited by the super ego.

(2) The absence of punishment stimulates anxiety and fear of the results if the behaviour is revealed to anyone. At this stage the secondary drive of fear takes over and becomes the main drive in need of reduction.

(3) The maintenance of secrecy, i.e. hiding behaviour from significant others, enhances the conflict and at the same time the impulse remains. There is therefore no reduction of the fear drive and the primary drive remains in the form of temptation to commit the act again.

(4) The individual is trapped by revulsion at his own behaviour and his reluctance to pay for it and be done with it. He is, in fact, in a state of guilt (London, 1964, p. 137).

It can be seen that in this sequence the main reinforcement is incremental. Mowrer would maintain that the prolongation of this situation would result in a spiralling increase of anxiety to the point of breakdown. It is also apparent that the learning sequence is a simple process of

conditioning. The problem for a therapist with Mowrer's orientation in dealing with a client in this situation becomes one of 'learning' or 'unlearning' rather than a specifically analytic one.

The place that Mowrer has arrived at can be illustrated by the following rather lengthy quotation:

Let us examine this point of view in the light of two-factor learning theory. We see at once that problem-saving activity which takes the form of social duplicity and conscious deception and repression amounts to an attack upon the sign-learning functions. Parents are the source of much social conditioning, and conscience is the reservoir of that conditioning. Self-protective strategies of the kind just described are thus designed to neutralize the second form of learning in large and important areas of the individual's life. To put the matter somewhat enigmatically: the neurotic is an individual who has learned how not to learn. What such a statement means is that the neurotic is a person in whom solution learning is directed against sign learning, instead of these two forms of learning functioning harmoniously and complementing each other. E. B. Holt once remarked that conditioning, or associative learning, "brought mind into being." It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the individual who systematically attempts to keep this mechanism from operating commonly complains of "poor memory" and of the feeling that he is losing his mind. Perhaps a more apt formulation is that he is destroying his mind, or at least an essential part of it! (Mowrer, 1967, p. 21).

It could with equal force be argued that his position is a function of his background in a "fundamentalist" Sunday School and Church. He quotes Scriptures extensively, e.g. Psalm 139: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? Or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If

I ascend into heaven thou art there. If I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 155).

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD FREUD

A subtitle in one of these chapters is entitled "The Devil and Psychopathology" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 155). In this particular chapter he endorses Bakan's accusations that Freud was "playing the Devil" but not in the constructive way that Freud believed. Mowrer quotes Freud's statement:

Do you not know that I am the Devil?
All my life I have had to play the Devil,
in order that others would be able to
build the most beautiful cathedrals with
the materials that I produced (Mowrer, 1961, p. 116).

He regards Freud as having entered into a pact with Satan to gain his help in the struggle against depression, which is the work of the super ego. The interest of Freud and Mowrer in this kind of metaphor is itself fascinating.

HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH CHRISTIAN IDEAS

Mowrer's whole writings in the area of guilt are filled with Biblical references. He quotes Ecclesiastes 5:7, Isaiah 13:9, Psalm 90, Job 19:21. "Have pity upon me, have pity upon me, O my friends; for the hand of God hath touched me." He is fascinated by the book of Daniel with its description of the madness of Nebuchadnezzar. He mentions

such phrases as the "wrath of God" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 28), "hardness of heart" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 29).

This is not to suggest that Mowrer agrees with the original meaning of the terms he uses or of the position of the Christian believer. He strongly criticizes the Faith at Work Group.

It is radically Christocentric, which will exclude, offend, or confuse not only the people of non Christian nations, but also large and growing segments of people of our own society who desperately need and have much to contribute to this type of spiritual practice and discipline (Mowrer, 1964, p. 22).

What is worthy of comment is Mowrer's own familiarity with, and use of, Christian ideas whether in his acceptance of them or rejection. He uses them continually to illustrate his point.

Holy Spirit, Right Divine, truth within my conscience reign; Be my King that I may be, firmly bound, forever free (Mowrer, 1964, p. 53).

This is used to illustrate that "Regulations, I would repeat, are not intended to be -- and in fact usually are not -- restrictive, but liberating" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 53). It is a quotation he repeats in his Foreword to Glasser's book "Reality Therapy: it's not 'Insight' 'Understanding' and 'Freedom' the neurotic needs but commitment" (Glasser, 1965, p. XVI). This is a Christian group who emphasize strongly open confession of their faith and their past failures.

It is obviously impossible to understand Mowrer's

view without making extensive examination of its Biblical and theological ramifications.

THE MEETING OF PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION ON THE ISSUE OF GUILT

There are the two major elements to be found in Mowrer that concern us here, the psychologist and the theologian. The psychologist is a rigorous researcher but also sees himself as a member in spirit of the third force interested in the human and therapeutic implications, having given enormous impetus to the discussion of real guilt and values and, though greatly respected, a figure of considerable controversy. The theologian shows him remarkably well read in the Bible itself, conversant with the Hymns of the Church, familiar with Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Tillich, Barth, Bonhoeffer, Buber, as well as Boisen and Van Dusen and many others. In some ways, again, very contemporary yet essentially at war with many of the central pre-suppositions of the Christian Faith.

No contemporary writer or indeed any person within the past hundred years combines in this way such interests at such depth. We will look at the development of his ideas concerning guilt and some reactions to them by other psychologists with a similar interest. We will also examine his religious point of view as it relates to this topic.

Could progress in handling guilt be made by a better rounded use of all the resources available to man? If there is any truth at all in the contention by Mowrer and others that the churches have abdicated their role here and have listened all too gullibly to current "solutions" according to psychiatry, psychology, sociology, etc., then in fairness to man both the Church and the psychologist had better look again at both their roles and responsibilities.

CHAPTER II

MOWRER'S CONCEPT OF GUILT IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

REIK'S CLAIM THAT GUILT HAD NOT BEEN TREATED SERIOUSLY SINCE FREUD

In a recent thesis Robert Wilderman quotes a statement by Theodor Reik that the construct of guilt had not at that time been studied seriously by anyone since Freud. The actual quotation is as follows:

If the sense of guilt is the hallmark of civilized humanity is it not astonishing that psychological research has scarcely made any progress in this area since Freud characterized it as the most important problem of civilization more than 27 years ago (Reik, 1957, p. 3).

There are a couple of implications behind this point of view. It obviously implies that Freud took the issue of guilt seriously. In a sense this is true yet the thing that he took seriously, if Mowrer and others are to be believed, was guilt feelings rather than guilt itself.

As a statement of fact it would have to be regarded as a gross overstatement. In the intervening period many psychologists have taken the issue of guilt seriously. This would include Freud's colleague, W. Stekel, and Anton T. Boisen who has exercised a powerful influence on the pastoral psychology movement. It ignores also David P.

Ausubel's views on the relationships between shame and guilt in the socializing process and those on whom he comments. These are to name only a few.

However it is certainly true that since the particular attention given by Mowrer to the subject there has been a renewed interest both in the subject of guilt and in the underlying issue of values. This is not to say that we are near any kind of basic agreement. There is still a great deal of ambiguity and disagreement. Maslow drew attention to the fact that,

The serious thing for each person to recognize vividly and poignantly, each for himself, is that every falling away from species virtue, and every crime against one's own nature, every evil act, every one without exception records itself in our unconscious and makes us despise ourselves (Maslow, 1962, p. 4 and 5).

This at first sight comes very close to Mowrer's concept of sin in its constructive aspects. Yet Maslow's conception of the cause of neurosis is entirely different from that of Mowrer. Maslow sees it as a deficiency disease while Mowrer sees it as the product of real transgression. Maslow also raises the issue of "what kind of guilt comes from being true to yourself and not to others?" (Maslow, 1962, p. 114), a question which hardly arises as Mowrer conceptualizes socialization.

The seriousness of guilt is emphasized by Viktor Frankl. He speaks of "the tragic triad of human existence,

namely pain, death and guilt" (Frankl, 1967, p. 15).

Yet Frankl refuses to blame the neurotic for his state and holds an opposite opinion to Mowrer at this point.

Logotherapy is far from holding man responsible for neurotic or even psychotic symptoms. However it does hold him accountable for his attitude toward these symptoms (Frankl, 1967, p. 75).

Indeed Frankl violently opposes the confrontation tactics that easily become part of Mowrer's therapy.

Imagine the potential effect of confronting the psychotic patient with such spiritualistic even moralistic interpretation of his illness in terms of existential guilt. It would just offer additional content to the patient's pathological tendency towards self accusation and suicide might well be his response (Frankl, 1967, p. 76).

While, therefore, there is a great deal of interest in guilt, its reality, its causes and its cure, there is little basic agreement between those who take it seriously on these matters.

A primary difficulty in understanding Mowrer's position is his particular use of a theological vocabulary. He was featured in Newsweek Magazine as "the man who put sin back into psychology" and who was concerned with concepts such as "hell and damnation". He is very much aware of this criticism.

I have repeatedly been asked by psychologists and psychiatrists: "But why must you use that awful word 'sin', instead of some more neutral term such as 'wrong doing', 'irresponsibility' or 'immorality'?" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 47).

It is important to notice that whenever Mowrer uses a term he usually defines it very carefully. Sin to him is not whatever causes one to go to hell, in the old-fashioned sense. Hell to him is a state of mind that leads to neurosis and psychosis. Sin is anything that carries one towards that form of perdition.

Incidentally, Mowrer has a rather unusual idea of the nature of personal sin.

Personal sin occurs, as I see it, and sows the seed of psychological destruction when and only when the individual violates a social injunction or regulation but pretends that he has not (Mowrer, 1961, p. 147).

If this is to be understood literally, wrong doing is only wrong when a person pretends that he has not done it. It is not therefore a sin to commit murder. It is a sin to plead not guilty when one has committed murder.

Nevertheless the whole idea of sin and the reality of guilt brings him into direct conflict with Freud.

MOWRER'S REASONS FOR REJECTING FREUD

It is important to understand clearly what has brought Mowrer to his theoretical position. It arose not out of empirical evidence or learning theory but directly out of his own experience. It provides an interesting endorsement of the conviction that experience must "precede the introduction of a theoretical concept" (Schein and Bennis, 1963, p. 19).

Mowrer sets it out as follows:

For some 15 years between 1929 and 1944 I personally was in and out of psychoanalysis four times for a total of about 700 contact hours. And as a professional psychologist, I believed in and was affiliated with analysis as a scientific enterprise. But eventually it became apparent that psychoanalysis did not hold for me or for scores of other persons who had resorted to it, the promise we once thought it did, and I began looking at it critically but still sympathetically in an attempt to find out what was wrong (Mowrer, 1964, p. 182).

This sense of intense personal disappointment and disillusionment appears to be one of the roots of the massive attack mounted by Mowrer on the Freudian position.

He quotes the comment by Rogers,

The year 1962-63 I spent as a fellow at the Center for Advance Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford.... Another important influence was my contact with Erik Erikson, a splendid person whose very appearance is therapeutic and several other psychoanalysts, foreign as well as American. From them I learned what I had strongly suspected that psychoanalysis as a school of thought is dead but that out of loyalty and other motives none but the very great analysts mention this fact as they go on to develop theories and ways of working very remote from or entirely opposed to the Freudian views (Mowrer, 1968, p. 62).

In the same connection he quotes Erikson,

We analysts must grudgingly admit that even as we were trying to devise with scientific determinism a therapy for the few we were led to promote an ethical disease among the many (Mowrer, 1968, p. 62).

Also Kubie:

We analysts have no right to be for or against anything in this field. We have a right only to the most complete humility, humility that says we

still know practically nothing about many important elements in the neurotic process or in the psychotherapeutic process (Mowrer, 1968, p. 62).

Mowrer's rather biting comment to conclude this exchange is that:

It would be a happier day when Kubie's psychoanalytic colleagues generally share his and Erik Erickson's humility (Mowrer, 1968, p. 62).

A major contention then of Mowrer is quite simple: that the Freudians themselves have given up on Freud. As has already been pointed out, Mowrer also objects to Freudian ideas on the basis of learning theory. The contention that early experiences strongly affect adult personality he believes to be a negation of the principle established by animal experimentation that all fears move towards extinction.

A further objection to Freud is the denial of human responsibility, that to Mowrer is the logical outcome of blaming others,

Have we not been taught on high authority that personality disorder is not one's own "Fault", that the neurotic is not 'responsible' for his suffering, that he has done nothing wrong, committed no 'sin'? 'Mental illness', according to a poster which was widely circulated a few years ago, 'is no disgrace. It might happen to anyone'. And behind all this, of course, was the Freudian hypothesis that neurosis stems from a 'too severe superego', which is the product of a too strenuous socialization of the individual at the hands of harsh, unloving parents and an irrational society. The trouble lay, supposedly, not in anything wrong or 'sinful' which the individual

has himself done, but in things he merely wants to do but cannot, because of repression.

The neurotic was thus not sinful but sick, the helpless, innocent victim of 'the sins of the fathers', and could be rescued only by a specialized, esoteric form of treatment.

Anna Russell catches the spirit of this doctrine well when she sings, in "Psychiatric Folksong",

At three I had a feeling of
Ambivalence toward my brothers,
And so it follows naturally
I poisoned all my lovers.
But now I'm happy; I have learned
The lesson this has taught;
That everything I do that's wrong
Is someone else's fault.

Mowrer, 1961, pp. 48-49).

This is a favourite theme of Mowrer's. He lumps together the psychoanalysts, the behaviourists and the Calvinists as all denying human responsibility, and being largely responsible for the evasion of it which is the cause, in his view, of so much guilt and turmoil.

Mowrer is opposed to the system of private practice as the Freudian analyst carried it out. His reason for this is that it encourages confession to the psychiatrist only and discourages it to those who are the significant others in the patient's life. It is the openness that Mowrer regards as vital in a return to healthy living and relationships (Mowrer, 1964, p. 93).

Indeed Mowrer believes that in order to help individuals the opposite approach to the psychoanalytic is

necessary. He contrasts the Freudian approach with that of Synanon¹ by quoting the comments of an individual who experienced both:

In most institutional settings, and in most psychoanalytic or socially oriented or tradition-directed treatment centers for dope fiends, your guilt is usually ameliorated. "You're a sick fellow; you can't help yourself; you have an acting-out disorder, together we will work this thing out, re-socialize you and everything will be 'crazy'. So, of course, what people like myself do is, they take all this ammunition, they fuel themselves with the fact that they are acting out a disorder. What can they do? They have all the data, so they go and act out" (Mowrer, 1968, pp. 64-65).

The use of guilt in a productive and constructive way is endorsed by Synanon where "they lay guilt upon guilt".

Mowrer further rejects the Freudian view that all human conflicts are intra-personal (intra-psychic), caused by opposing conflict within the personality structure. He believes with Adler that all problems and conflicts are inter-personal (Mowrer, 1969, p. 8).

Mowrer opts for what he and others call the third force in psychology which he says promotes such things as:

Free will, the capacity for choice, self-direction, responsibility, creativity. For a long time concepts of this nature seemed to be scientifically quite inadmissible (Mowrer, 1969, p. 3).

¹Synanon is an institution that works with the rehabilitation of drug addicts.

WHAT THEN IS THE NATURE OF GUILT ACCORDING TO MOWRER?

There are many definitions and descriptions of guilt throughout Mowrer's writings. Guilt is not regarded as undesirable, either for the individual or for society. On the contrary it is exceedingly valuable and constructive.

He throws down the gauntlet to the Freudians as follows:

Guilt ... is the central problem - not just guilt feelings, as Freud so beguilingly suggested, but real, palpable, indisputable guilt; disturbed people are not 'disturbed' for nothing. Where neurosis or psychosis is purely functional (as it usually is), the individual, I believe, always has a hidden history of serious misconduct which has not been adequately compensated and 'redeemed' (Mowrer, 1961, p. 57).

There can be little doubt that guilt is, for him, real, of central importance and arises out of misbehaviour on the part of the individual concerned, misbehaviour that has not been dealt with by that individual.

A more extensive definition is contained in The New Group Therapy.

Guilt is the fear a person feels after having committed an act which is disapproved by the significant others in his life, before the act is detected and confessed.

Guilt, in short, is the fear of being found out and punished (Mowrer, 1964, p. 226).

Guilt occurs then after an act has been performed -- not before. It results from an act the individual realizes would meet with disapproval on the part of those

he considers of significance to him. It is experienced not because he has been detected but for the very opposite reason he has not been discovered and is very much afraid that he will be.

A more succinct definition is given by Mowrer in a recent paper.

Guilt is the cognitive and emotional state one experiences following a transgression in the absence of external knowledge or detection of the act (Mowrer, 1969, p. 12).

This goes over some of the ground already traversed in slightly less detail. It does, though, separate the elements in the experience of guilt and stresses the cognitive as well as the affective.

Mowrer is emphatically committed to the view that at the heart of guilt lies wrong doing. We are ill, not because anyone has deprived us of anything but because we are depraved. In all cases of serious emotional disturbance he believes there is a "history of palpable misconduct, which is neither admitted nor atoned for" (Mowrer, 1964, pp. 26, 185).

In order to make his point of departure from Freud on this issue abundantly clear he is convinced that guilt really arises when the "id has succeeded in captivating the ego" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 185).

Mowrer's understanding of the dynamics involved is the opposite of Freud's.

Here it is assumed that the ego is taken captive not by the super ego but by the id, and that it is now the "voice of conscience" that is rejected and is dissociated. "Anxiety" thus arises, not because of a threatened return of repressed energies of the id, but because of the unheeded railings and anger of conscience. Here it is not assumed that there is any difference in the "size" or strength of these three aspects of personality, unless it is that the ego is somewhat weak and undeveloped (Mowrer, 1964, p. 185).

Quite clearly the trouble is caused not by what the individual is afraid he might do. It arises out of what he has actually done. It is an unwillingness to acknowledge and compensate for offences that compounds the situation. It is the fear of being found out. It is not saintliness but sin that is the cause of the difficulty. The issue is very much one of morality. This comes out also in the distinction he draws between guilt and shame and in the value of guilt as he conceptualizes it.

For Mowrer there is a significant distinction to be drawn between guilt and shame.

Shame ... occurs when an individual has broken an agreement or violated a "MOS" and has been caught in, or shortly after, the transgression (Mowrer, 1969, p. 11).

Guilt arises because the individual's offence has not been discovered (Mowrer, 1969, p. 12). What at first seems to be a great advantage becomes in the end a considerable calamity.

Characteristically secrecy and deception permit the occurrence of some pleasurable deviant act (or lack of action) which is

immediate and pleasurable, and the disadvantage of secrecy and deception usually become apparent only at a much later date -- so much later in fact, that the connection is not always seen (Mowrer, 1967, p. 31).

He goes on to say:

... if the negative results of deception came immediately and its rewards later, there would probably also be very few "habitual" liars and correspondingly fewer "neurotics" (Mowrer, 1967, p. 32).

In Mowrer's eyes guilt is not to be regarded as any disaster. It has two basic social functions. It encourages the individual to resist temptation, and also supplies a powerful motive to change one's wrong behaviour. It is at one and the same time "a form of atonement and motivation for change" (Mowrer, 1969, p. 13). It therefore has the effect of reducing interpersonal discord and strife.

The symptoms that guilt give rise to are of value because they communicate to other people a sense that something is wrong. A consequence of this is that they "provide an unintended and inexplicit 'confession'."

They are also a source of suffering and incapacity to the person displaying them and thus provide again unintentionally, 'unconsciously' -- a form of atonement and motivation for change (Mowrer, 1969, p. 13).

The essence then of Mowrer's position is that guilt is a function of an offence having been committed, which would be disapproved of by significant others. It has neither been detected nor atoned for. This results in anxiety that is both cognitive and affective. These

symptoms are of value both to society, in general, and the individual in particular. They are an "unintended and inexplicit confession". They provide an unintentional atonement. They set the individual up in a mood for change and reformation.

HOW TO DEAL WITH GUILT, ACCORDING TO MOWRER

Guilt arises out of unconfessed sin and must be purged by confession and restitution. One feels bad because one is bad and will make no progress until the badness is acknowledged and a program of restitution begun and continued.

In a situation of this kind, the "therapy" of choice involves a fully explicit and detailed confession, followed by appropriate restitution, and either reaffirmation, and renegotiation, or formal dissolution of the contractual understanding and relationship which has previously existed between the defendant and the plaintiff, before their "trouble" and estrangement (Mowrer, 1969, p. 14).

There are obviously many questions raised by these statements by Mowrer that demand some answers. What evidence is there to confirm his contentions and what constitutes evidence at this point? If sin is of such significance what is it? Is there only one cause of guilt and is Mowrer himself consistent at this point? Sin implies a position on ethics but what ethics? Is the choice absolute or situational or if we opt for contract ethics do we then become legalists and Pharisees? What

about the socialization issue? Assuming, for the moment, the validity of his position what is the cure to be prescribed?

In essence, it consists of anything which anyone can do to help persuade an estranged "neurotic" person (1) to voluntarily confess his mistakes, so that conscience does not have to force the truth out of him "symptomatically" and (2) to enter into a life of willing sacrifice instead of the involuntary suffering and sacrifice which neurosis involves. When these two things come to pass 'neurosis' simply melts away, for the conflict of interests within the total personality which has been the essence of the neurosis no longer exists and the individual is restored to human community, to 'fellowship', which superego has been insisting upon and ego resisting (Mowrer, 1964, p. 140).

Mowrer castigates Protestantism for its neglect of confession and its denial of the need for "works". The whole heart of therapy for Mowrer lies in confession and restitution. At the same time he rejects the type of therapy where the "patient" confesses to the therapist in the privacy and confidentiality of the relationship. The necessity is for open confession.

In this connection Mowrer has some fascinating views on early Christianity, the causes of the reformation and the growth of communism. He ties all of this into the issue of open confession and restitution. He believes that for the first 400 years of the Christian era personal confession was entirely or at least very commonly made in public and penitence was equally open and known.

He believes that the effort of the church to seal

confession, that is to make the sin involved and the ensuing absolution private, led to its disruption. It affected the integrity and vitality of the church to such a point that the Protestant rebellion or reformation took place. While this was a prime cause of the reformation the reformers were not successful in dealing with this particular issue satisfactorily. Their prohibiting the sale of indulgences dealt with only half of the issue. The result was that, in Mowrer's view it also left us with no satisfactory way to deal with personal guilt.

He makes the point that communism which he regards as the enemy of contemporary Christianity and Western civilization, is employing the techniques and dynamics of the early church, even if in a perverted yet astonishing, powerful way.

In the communist we see not simply a deep commitment at work but also the use of open confession and restitution. He regards the growth of communism as a function not of its economic policies but its psychological appeal. He praises also the "Faith at Work" group for their attitude towards openness and restitution. This is a well known inter-church group in the U.S. that majors on open confession of past moral failures and encourages a high degree of sharing of their faith. While he has serious misgivings about their emphasis on theology, he is enthused over their dynamics.

The central emphasis was on the recurrent testimony of persons who had been in sin and misery and who were now, as a result of a new policy of openness and restitution, rediscovering a sense of at-one-ment and were in or entering a period of serenity and joy (Mowrer, 1964, p. 21).

Mowrer praises the Roman Catholic Church for their acknowledgement of the value of confession though he sees serious deficiencies in how it operates. It tends to ignore real guilt. The admission of sin by the penitent is not sufficiently explicit. The prescribed penitence is often only a token of what would be necessary and sufficient psychologically and socially. The idea of confession to God only is for him also inadequate because it is private and it is a dangerous substitute for the more direct and painful kinds of honesty.

The emphasis on the necessity for confession arises out of Mowrer's profound conviction that there is no private solution possible for the issue of guilt. Because guilt arises out of a breach of relationship it can only be healed by a restitution of those relationships. He recognizes nevertheless that there are limitations to the value of confession.

I would be naive to believe and dishonest to claim that the shared form of confession works universally. With sociopaths and paranoid individuals, the distrust and rejection of human relationship may be so ingrained that the best one can do in this respect will not be enough to inspire reciprocal confession (Mowrer, 1964, p. 168).

However, even in situations not as severe as those quoted, Mowrer is committed to the view that confession is not enough and must be accompanied by restitution.

Confession is not of itself, dynamically sufficient and must in many instances be accompanied by some form of atonement or explication (Mowrer, 1961, p. 104).

It is in this connection that Mowrer greatly favours active programs of restitution. He is particularly enthused by the program of Alcoholics Anonymous.

The trail which AA has blazed is the only only down which I can at present gaze and see anything that looks like the road to the future. How AA principles can be adapted or modified to meet the needs of other kinds of confused and suffering people is not fully clear to me. But I am as sure as I can be of anything that no therapy will be radically and broadly successful which does not take the neurotic's guilt seriously and does not help him admit his errors and find ways to work in dead earnest to rectify and compensate for them (Mowrer, 1961, pp. 109-110).

A more recent comment on this by Mowrer is that "the effectiveness of these programs dramatically exceeds anything which has been devised by professional psychiatrists or psychologists" (Mowrer, 1968, p. 59).

Mowrer is convinced that if we follow this line of approach, sin, guilt, confession and restitution, we will find the way to real recovery. Not only this but it will lead us to act in such a fashion as to prevent problems from arising.

His philosophy of therapy is in part based on the conviction that:

If we hide our sins and display our virtues, we are constantly vulnerable, insecure, anxious, guilty, but that if we follow the reverse policy, we develop strength, self-confidence and mental health (Mowrer, 1964, p. 108).

There are many advantages to this approach if it is valid. One is that it can bring a sense of immediate relief and recovery on the part of the person being treated. In the case of a particular individual, Mrs. Thomas, he notes:

The relief she experienced was so dramatic that she was soon discharged from hospital (Mowrer, 1964, p. 19).

The therapist would, however, be in great danger of becoming a combination detective, moralist and judge. Find the offence, place a moral judgement on it, persuade the patient to admit and publicly confess it and prescribe suitable restitution.

The Chief of Psychological Services in the hospital where Mrs. Thomas was a patient made the following comment:

In observing this particular group-therapy program, I have noted two things (1) these persons who are able to benefit from it, do so in an unusually rapid way, and (2) when they return to their home community, they have a better way of understanding and explaining to others the experience they have been through (Mowrer, 1964, p. 116).

The thing that is significant to Mowrer is not just the speed of recovery as contrasted with other approaches, but the restoration to community with a rationale for dealing with life situations.

THE EVIDENCE MOWRER ADDUCES TO SUPPORT
HIS POSITION

While it is true that Mowrer's views had their origin in personal experience he does not rest his case there. He mounts a fierce attack on the alternatives. He argues that the result of treatment by the psychoanalyst is either that the patient is "cured" and becomes a sociopath, or rebels against the analyst and rejects the treatment, neither alternative being desirable. The treatment ends up being countertherapeutic.

He also reviews a number of studies including the famous one by Eysenck that indicates:

When the likelihood of spontaneous remission is taken into account, the accomplishment is, in fact, almost exactly nil. In other words, untreated controls (to the extent that such controls are possible) seem to fare about as well as treated groups (Mowrer, 1961, p. 235).

He uses a combination of logical and psychological inconsistencies, learning theory, common observation, evidence from the Bible and other religions, literary arguments from authors of such diverse talents as Shakespeare and Lloyd Douglas and a great deal of clinical experience to buttress his arguments against his opponents and in favour of his own position. The combined weight is, in this writer's view, impressive.

He sums up his position with these words:

On the basis of continued clinical experience and common observation, an alternative

hypothesis has emerged to the effect that psychopathology actually reflects under-socialization: in the extreme form in the sociopath, in more moderate form in the so-called neurotic. Empirical studies have been reported within the past ten years, and are here reviewed, which powerfully support the second of these contentions (Mowrer, 1968, p. 1).

One such study quoted repeatedly by Mowrer is that of Kirkendall (Mowrer, 1961, p. 214; Mowrer, 1964, p. 186; 1964, pp. 203-4; Mowrer, 1968, p. 4). Kirkendall claims to have found "a striking correlation between a student's general social adjustment and the degree of normality in his sex life" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 214). Swensen supports these findings, in his case using women students. These studies would in Mowrer's opinion confirm that highly socialized outgoing young persons tend to be well adjusted and normal in the sexual area, not "neurotic" as psycho-analytic theory would imply.

In this extensive paper entitled, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychotherapy", Mowrer reviews an impressive list of empirical studies all tending to confirm his main positions. This includes one by Professor John M. Digman who was skeptical of Mowrer's thesis that the neurotic was not over-socialized. A later study (1968) to his surprise confirmed Mowrer and denied Freud.

All of this leads Mowrer to affirm his views and to conclude that the neurotic:

Instead of falling at the high end of a socialization continuum (as psychoanalytic theory suggests) actually falls at an intermediate point between sociopathy at the low end and normal persons at the high end (Mowrer, Feb. 1968, p. 22).

A serious objection to the use made by Mowrer of empirical evidence is his tendency to specify causality in one direction or another from correlational studies. For example in the study by Swensen, the fact that there was a higher incidence of sexual misconduct among the "therapy" group does not establish that the misconduct was the cause of their seeking therapy. It could just as easily be argued that the neurotic tendencies of the experimental group caused their deviant behaviour. The same issue can be put in the form of a question, "To what extent are anti-social acts the result of an illness, or are such acts causal to the illness" (Fair, 1965, p. 4). Whether, in fact, we have the tools to undertake the kind of research needed to confirm or deny Mowrer's contention is very open to question. This is an issue occupying the serious attention of contemporary researchers.

Probably far more crucial is the fact that a new type of research is needed, research in many ways conceptually different from traditional scientific research. Its language will be more that of the poet than of the mathematician, for the knowledge to be ordered has to do with feelings as well as thoughts, and the symbols to be used are not subject to mathematical manipulation. Its methodology will be different, for the investigator must be willing to become the instrument of investigation (Severin, 1965, p. 291).

CAN MOWRER'S VIEW BE INTEGRATED WITH
THOSE OF OTHERS?

An issue that is raised continually in any discussion of Mowrer's views on sin and guilt is whether some kind of accommodation can be made between the views of Mowrer and Freud. To put it in one form the question involves whether sin is the only cause of guilt. Or it might be reframed to satisfy the theological scruples of Meehl. Is the individual's own sin the cause of that individual's own neuroticism?

In the discussion that follows it will be seen that David Ausubel, Paul Meehl and David Belgum, who each accept the concept of real guilt, are all unwilling to approve of Mowrer's exclusiveness.

Jourrard and Eysenck would make the necessary compromise but Mowrer finds their position unacceptable. He rejects such efforts at compromise and casts doubt on any suggestion that there is a:

Residual class of persons who, as Freud insisted, suffer from overconscientiousness rather than justified and realistic pangs of conscience (Mowrer, 1961, p. 225).

Such people in Mowrer's view are merely suffering from "displaced guilt" which originally was only too real (Mowrer, 1961, p. 227).

There is some real doubt, however, if Mowrer is fully persuaded. He says at one stage:

The present writer is entirely willing to leave the answer to this question open, pending further research and experience (Mowrer, 1961, p. 81).

He goes on to add a rather illuminating comment:

But even if guilt is real (rather than illusory) in only half or a third of all personality disturbances it still constitutes an Enormous practical problem (Mowrer, 1961, p. 81).

Admittedly this is, in part, a logical device to gain the ear of those who would be more willing to compromise than he is. However the two comments taken together could indicate a greater ambivalence on his own part.

Human experience would endorse the comment of Barry Stevens:

There seem to be two levels of guiltiness. The deeper one when I am not true to myself. My deeper self, then, seems to be reproaching me. The other guilt comes when I do what is in accord within me but without seeing clearly (sometimes not seeing at all) the distinction between what I want and what others say that I should want (Stevens, 1967, p. 70).

The whole issue seems bedevilled not by one or two levels, or by one or two alternatives but by layer upon layer and combinations of layers and alternatives. One thing is certain the issue has been raised with real debate largely because of Mowrer. The degree to which real guilt is being taken seriously both by the psychologist and the pastoral counselor is a function, in part, of the directness and vehemence of Mowrer.

SOCIALIZATION AND GUILT, AS MOWRER SEES IT

Intimately involved in the discussion of sin is that of socialization and ethics. On the issue of socialization Mowrer holds to a viewpoint quite out of fashion today. He emphasizes man as a social creature rather than as an individual.

Man is preeminently a social creature ... he lives or dies psychologically and personally as a function of the openness, community, relatedness and integrity which by good actions he attains and by evil actions destroys (Mowrer, 1964, p. 64).

He regards the history of man as a "progression from a state of lawlessness and disorder to civilization with many periods of moral struggle and conflict in between" (Mowrer, 1968, p. 37B). He maintains that:

If Freud's conception of the relationship between socialization and anxiety were valid, there would have been no real incentive for mankind to abandon savagery (sociopathy) and move toward civilization (morality), since such a course of action could only make matters progressively worse, as far as anxiety is concerned (Mowrer, 1968, p. 37B).

He also responds to the question, "What if society itself is pathological?" "Would not in such circumstances the 'normal' person be the one who deviates? He argues that only individuals become pathological not society. Further he claims that there is a "healthy" way for the person to handle this matter.

Contractual agreements and understandings, formal and informal, provide the very basis of social order, co-operation, and division of

labor, and to abandon these is to lose the entire point and advantage of social living (Mowrer, 1968, p. 37F).

If one is genuinely against a given social system, then it is no longer his system ... He has renounced his loyalty to the group and should expect, and receive, neither privilege nor protection from it (Mowrer, 1968, p. 37G).

Mowrer is not arguing for any blind conformity to any particular group. Indeed he is essentially arguing the opposite. The healthy person has choices, he can opt in or out or he can negotiate a new agreement. What he cannot do if he wishes to remain healthy is to be deceitful or hypocritical.

It is only when the individual is too weak or cowardly to leave or to work for change and he decides instead simply to cheat that 'neurosis' is in store for him (Mowrer, 1968, p. 37G).

Mowrer is pleading for "integrity, consistency, responsibility, authenticity within the social system where one purportedly 'belongs'" (Mowrer, 1968, p. 37H) not for blind acceptance of an inevitable or corrupt socializing process.

He admits the accuracy of the studies that show a high correlation between poor home conditions and neurosis. Yet he rejects the argument that the first causes the second. The difficulty, as he sees it, is that such homes produce individuals who have personal defects that prevent them from reaching a high degree of "social and moral competence."

Neurosis is simply the kind of trouble which human beings get into with themselves when they protractedly practice immature and perverse interpersonal strategies (Mowrer, 1964, p. 203).

Nevertheless by solving one problem Mowrer seems to have created another one. In such cases, is it not irrelevant to charge such individuals to discover where they have sinned, especially as they have been admittedly sinned against? Would it not be better to provide them with a warm and accepting relationship that would help to remove the emotional limitations that have prevented them from reaching "social and Moral competence?"

The socialization issue focuses on the matter of making contracts. It is also his most recent attempt to find an answer to a question he previously addressed to himself. "Can the notion of sin be objectively, scientifically defined?" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 130).

He argues that man has to unite his volition and his sociality. This he succeeds in doing by means of contracts freely entered into and which are binding unless renegotiated openly and honestly. The individual has, according to Mowrer, the freedom to make his contracts in the light of today's situations.

The question of what affirmations, commitment, contract one ought to make is surely an open one in a free society - and even society, free or totalitarian must itself occasionally change its assumptions and procedures (Mowrer, 1969, p. 24).

Sin is a violation of contract. It will be all the

more painful for being secret. In violating contracts the individual is violating himself. "We are our contract systems -- CONTRACTO ERGO SUM" (Mowrer, 1968, p. 23).

The contract is, in his view, an integrating factor binding man and society together.

All this leaves many questions unanswered. Can contract ethics give birth to love or will they not degenerate in legalism, Pharisaism and causistry? Are there largely unwritten and unspoken contracts that are binding on all men at all times and distinguish man from the animals? What does a person do in a totalitarian society when the choice is between "secret violation and repression?

The view of Mowrer that contract violation is personal sin which when compounded by secrecy leads to psychopathology may be valid but it is much more complicated than he acknowledges. The most serious violation may very well be "cheating" or hypocrisy, but it is surely not the essence of sin.

Personal sin occurs, as I see it, and sows the seed of psychological destruction when and only when the individual violates a social injunction or regulation but pretends that he has not (Mowrer, 1961, p. 14).

Surely the essence of sin is that in some sense the person has violated a moral principle. To "pretend he has not" may make the offence more serious but the violation is the essential nature of sin.

Mowrer argues also that:

All major forms of personality disorder (excluding of course, those with demonstrable organic or biochemical basis) can be usefully identified as instances of contract anomaly (Mowrer, 1969, p. 35).

This is a view that many others could not accept. Are we to allow no validity for heredity at all? Are we back to the "empty organism"? Are there no residual effects of traumatic childhood experiences or adult trauma?

The idea of contract ethics is interesting but it raises many more problems than Mowrer discusses. What really makes a contract binding? The fact that it has been made or the fact that it is inherently right? If the first, would it not lead to legalism? If the latter, what makes it inherently right? It must be something superior to contract and then that must be the central issue.

There are other psychologists who have major points of agreement with Mowrer on the reality of guilt yet disagree with other of his concepts. It may help to clarify the issue by examining their viewpoints.

THE VIEWS OF DAVID AUSUBEL ON GUILT

Ausubel shows a similar concern for the central significance of real guilt.

Guilt is one of the most important psychological mechanisms through which an individual becomes socialized in the way of his culture. It is also an important instrument for cultural survival since it constitutes a most efficient watchdog within each individual, serving to

keep his behaviour compatible with the moral values of the society in which he lives (Ausubel, 1955, p. 378).

He maintains that guilt is one mechanism legitimately used in child rearing that helps to secure the child's adherence to values in the absence of parents (Ausubel, 1955, p. 378). He goes on to show reason that "a social order unbuttressed by a sense of moral obligations in its members would enjoy precious little stability" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 378).

He takes issue with these social anthropologists with a psychoanalytic bias who:

Have advanced the notion that guilt is not universally present or prominent as a sanction in mediating and sustaining culture. Instead they have identified guilt as a unique property of the characterology of individuals who as children experience the kind of relationships with parents allowing for "super ego" formation (Ausubel, 1955, p. 378).

A contrast is drawn between persons brought up in the Judaic-Christian culture on the one hand and Samoans, Iatmul, Japanese, and the Navaho on the other.

Margaret Mead argues that:

The culture is primarily transmitted through such external sanctions as expediency in conforming to the rules, shared, undifferentiated fear, and anticipation of physical reprisals (Ausubel, 1955, p. 378).

Me makes what he calls a "critical examination of the criterion that these anthropologists have used in differentiating between shame and guilt (Ausubel, 1955, p. 378).

He then attempts to show that although the two kinds of sanctions are distinguishable from one another, they are nevertheless "Neither dichotomous nor mutually exclusive" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 379). He concludes that the development of guilt feelings is not dependent upon "The highly specific aspects of a unique kind of parent-child relationship" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 379).

Ausubel conceptualizes guilt,

As a special kind of negative self-evaluation which occurs when an individual acknowledges that his behaviour is at variance with a given moral value to which he feels obligated to conform (Ausubel, 1955, p. 379).

He regards the following developmental conditions as applying "before guilt feelings can become operative."

(a) The individual must accept certain standards of right and wrong or good and bad as his own.

(b) He must accept the obligations of regulating his own behaviour to conform to whatever standards he has thus adopted, and must feel accountable for lapses therefrom, and

(c) He must possess sufficient self-critical ability to recognize when a discrepancy between behaviour and internalized values occurs (Ausubel, 1955, p. 379).

He is of the opinion that the potential for acquiring the capacity for guilt is universal. Culture may make some differences but "differences among individuals within a culture would probably be as great or greater than differences among cultures" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 379).

When a sense of moral obligations and the capacity for guilt fail to be acquired it is due to some abnormal situations.

He goes on to conceptualize shame.

Generally, shame may be defined as an unpleasant emotional reaction by an individual to an actual or presumed negative judgment of himself by others resulting in self-depreciation vis-a-vis the group (Ausubel, 1955, p. 382).

He distinguishes between moral and non-moral shame. The former is further broken down "into two categories -- internalized and non-internalized."

Margaret Mead, he observes, maintains that "internalized shame only occurs when the parent is the interpreter and enforcer of the sanction" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 382).

Shame ... to Ausubel is only one of the components of guilt.

Guilt also involves other self reactions that are independent of the judgment of others, namely, self-reproach, self-disgust, self-contempt, remorse, lowered self-esteem, anxiety, and various characteristic and subjectively identifiable visceral and vasomotor responses (Ausubel, 1955, p. 382).

The distinction he makes between shame and guilt is that shame depends on external sanctions alone. Guilt depends on both internal and external sanctions.

Ausubel implies that the psychoanalytic bias of anthropologists he discusses make it impossible for them to read the evidence correctly.

They argue that guilt cannot arise unless there are two basic conditions fulfilled.

(a) The child must accept the parent or parent surrogate as omniscient or as qualitatively superior to himself in a moral sense, and

(b) He must accept the parent as the source of moral authority, i.e. as the 'referent' in whose name moral behaviour is enjoined (Ausubel, 1955, p. 383).

Ausubel maintains that these are not the appropriate criteria, that "there is neither convincing logical nor empirical justification for designating this criteria as a sine qua non for the acquisition of guilt behaviour" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 384).

It rules out the possibility of guilt behaviour developing in such groups as the Navaho Indians, rejected and extrinsically valued children, adults in most cultures, who in accordance with the developmental changes described above, transfer their allegiances from the moral authority of parents to the moral authority of society" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 384).

His criticism is a threefold one. The criteria for establishing guilt are not appropriate. They take no account of the developmental realities. The further assumption that "guilt and shame are incompatible and that genuine guilt must be devoid of shame and all external sanctions" is not valid and "simply does not conform to available naturalistic evidence" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 386).

The evidence seems clear that although Japanese and Navaho individuals are more responsive to shame than we are, much of this shame is really the shame of guilt, i.e., the shame accompanying awareness of violated moral obligations (Ausubel, 1955, p. 386).

He clinches this whole argument,

Finally, the external reference of guilt is apparent in the fact that it is reduced by punishment and confession. It always implies an offense against the group which, therefore, can only be pardoned by group action (Ausubel, 1955, p. 388).

He offers an interesting explanation of "why confession and atonement are such relatively inconspicuous aspects of Japanese guilt behaviour" (Ausubel, 1955, p. 388).

The more credible explanation is that although confession would be guilt reducing it would also be too traumatic in view of the tremendous Japanese sensitivity to shame. Under such circumstances, overwhelming feelings of guilt can be relieved less painfully by suicide (Ausubel, 1955, p. 389).

There are many ideas here shared by Ausubel and Mowrer. The centrality of real guilt, the validity of the socializing process, that guilt may be purged by confession and restitution and the rejection of the psychoanalytic bias.

These views were in circulation before 1955 and therefore predate Mowrer's main thrust. They add a powerful voice to Mowrer in his argument concerning the nature of guilt.

Ausubel shares with Mowrer and others in the need,

To restore moral judgment and accountability to a respectable place among the criteria used in evaluating human behaviour, both normal and abnormal (Ausubel, 1962, p. 62).

He however strongly rejects Mowrer's view that psychiatric symptoms are primarily reflective of unacknowledged sin. This view, if accepted, would in his judgment "turn back the psychiatric clock twenty-five hundred years" (Ausubel, 1962, p. 70). For Ausubel real guilt may be a contributing factor in behaviour disorder, but it is by no means the only or principle cause "thereof" (Ausubel, 1962, p. 75). The point is also made by him that:

The issue of culpability for symptoms is largely irrelevant in handling behaviour disorders (Ausubel, 1962, p. 74).

The points of agreement are real but quite clearly they are not a sufficient basis for real agreement between Ausubel and Mowrer. The points of disagreement are more significant and to Ausubel the viewpoint of Mowrer on these is not acceptable.

THE VIEWS OF PAUL MEEHL ON GUILT

Although at first sight Mowrer's ideas on guilt seem to herald more than a rapprochement with the Christian faith this is not what happens. He sees the Christian Church as contributing to the human dimension, or if not actually contributing at least having the potential. This

is not to argue that he is wrong in this view. It is to point out that this is his view. Insofar as the Christian Church can function on a small group level, deal more effectively with issues of morality, confession and restitution, it has more in many ways to offer than the psychotherapist. However for him AA's or any other similar group can do this just as well without getting mired in the theological issues.

In this writer's view a psychologist who has been more successful in his attempt to do what Mowrer does not succeed in doing is Paul Meehl. He and his colleagues have attempted to make a real rapprochement between Christian theology and psychology without denying the validity of either in their own area of prime concern. In doing this he focuses on some of the basic issues.

We are prepared to state firmly that he who does not come to terms with such theoretical problems as determinism, guilt, original sin, materialist monism, conscience, and conversion cannot even begin to work out a cognitive rapprochement between Christian theology and the secular science of behaviour (Meehl, 1958, p. 5).

Meehl operates inside the framework of confessional Lutheranism within the Missouri Synod. His theological viewpoint is therefore quite conservative in its bias.

A great deal has been said and written within Protestant circles about Freud and Christianity, largely in the fuzzy-minded and equivocating tradition with which so much of liberal Protestant writing is infected (Meehl, 1958, p. 2).

There are again obvious points of agreement and disagreement with Mowrer. This is illustrated by the following quotation.

For example the Christian Therapist, believing that the universe is governed by moral principles, will be sensitive to his patient's emotional problems arising from a guilt feeling and other emotional realities, but his diagnosis will include the recognition, that the patient being a sinner, is genuinely guilty. His view of a cure and its limitations will include the resources of God's grace in Christ for the forgiveness of sins. Whereas those with a narrower world view sometimes work, consciously or unconsciously toward getting rid of the notion of sin (Meehl, 1958, p. 26).

Mowrer would disagree with the implied theism, the value placed on forgiveness, the concept of "other emotional realities", and the dynamics of therapy as including "God's grace in Christ." There would be, however, very strong kinship in the recognition of the reality of sin, of genuine guilt and the concept that a narrower world view is as described by Meehl.

A major difficulty in comparing Meehl with Mowrer is Mowrer's determination to use Christian vocabulary and yet give it what he himself calls a naturalistic meaning. His theological words are all given non-theological definition. It would be possible to attribute to Mowrer many of Meehl's statements, but they do not appear to mean the same to both. Some examples of this include:

Man's anxiety is the product of his sinfulness, that state of alienation which exists between him and God, between man's

will (taken as the expression of his being) and God's will (Meehl, 1958, p. 55).

... whatever clinical forms it may take, anxiety has as its root source the sinner's knowledge that he is in a state of rebellion against, and consequent alienation from his Creator (Meehl, 1958, p. 216).

It is therefore literally correct to say that he develops a neurotic problem because of sin. If he did not have sin ... he would not be in the condition he is in (Meehl, 1958, p. 222).

For Meehl sin has a theistic element which gives it significance. Man is neurotic because of sin. However when it comes down to particular cases Meehl is not prepared to approach the cause of guilt as narrowly as Mowrer nor is he prepared to advocate a therapy which is composed of finding the sin, confession and restitution.

Meehl's argument is that if man were in a right relationship with God "anxiety" which for him includes guilt would not exist. He is further convinced that "at some level, in some sense" man is aware of this (Meehl, 1958, p. 217). A psychological state of valid guilt arises out of:

Man's objective sinful and alienated relation to God, with its attendant effects upon his relation to his fellows (Meehl, 1958, p. 22).

Meehl does, however, draw a sharp distinction between "being a neurotic" and "being a sinner."

Insofar as the patient wants to kill his boss, he is a sinner; insofar as he disguises this wish and its attendant guilt he is a neurotic (Meehl, 1958, p. 223).

He sees a different function for the secular therapist as opposed to the Christian.

Putting it crudely, the secular therapist's job is to help a neurotic sinner become a "healthy" one (Meehl, 1958, p. 224).

To restore both health and "earthly" happiness is the aim of both the secular and Christian therapist. He points out that in his view the therapist is not in the business of improving the client's morals or his standing with God. Though this may be a by-product of successful therapy.

... the psychotherapist's task is to heal neurotics, not to convert sinners or even reform scoundrels.

It is fascinating to see Mowrer having a very different aim from Meehl at this point. Mowrer would see no healing as having taken place unless the sinner is converted and the scoundrel reformed. Meehl does not believe either that the level of neuroticism is any indication of the level of sinfulness, nor does he believe that an experience of conversion will cure, though it may help, his neuroticism.

There is then the common ground in an acknowledgement of genuine guilt but for Meehl there are other kinds of guilt. There is common recognition of the reality and destructiveness of sin but for Meehl there are other causes for anxiety, in individual cases (Meehl, 1958, p. 24). To Meehl confession is important and valuable.

It is evident that there are profound spiritual and psychological results from confession and absolution (Meehl, 1958, p. 281).

However he encourages private confession to God alone or to the pastor alone, an approach rejected by Mowrer. There is also no significant emphasis on programs of restitution.

The measure of real agreement, in the end, between Meehl and Mowrer is minimal.

THE VIEWS OF DAVID BELGUM ON GUILT

Belgium is a Lutheran Theologian and pastoral counsellor who spent a year studying under Mowrer. Mowrer quotes him with approval (Mowrer, 1964, p. 7; 1964, p. 4). He sees their views coinciding on the importance of confession and the significance of the "loss and recovery of community."

However Belgium does not agree that guilt is the only cause of mental illness.

Surely there are many causes of mental illness and suffering besides guilt, but where personal guilt is the crucial problem in diagnosis and therapy, there religion and psychology meet (Belgium, 1963, p. 144).

Belgium considers the "secular" therapist inadequate as compared with the "religious" therapist.

The dilemma of the secular psychotherapist is that he tries to accomplish an enormous task of personal reconciliation with an inadequate and incomplete theory of the nature

of the universe, of society and of the individual person (Belgum, 1963, p. 46).

The mentally ill are to him proper objects of the church's ministry,

For one need not work long nor be very sophisticated in the field of mental illness to notice how often sin and guilt appear in case after case -- the symptoms of the mentally ill are the amplified and distorted voice of conscience (Belgum, 1963, p. 5).

Mental illness is, for him, tied in with the matter of hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is a particular offence and is of serious significance because "it is a method of dealing with sin which prevents a solution" (Belgum, 1963, p. 7).

Churches too often are permeated with hypocrisy, make "confession of sins one to another" virtually impossible. This is what has forced people to go outside the church and created organizations like Alcoholics Anonymous and many of the social service agencies (Belgum, 1963, pp. 12-13). This whole failure to deal openly with guilt is disastrous.

Belgum is convinced that guilt leads to the self punishment we call mental illness. It would be much better dealt with by what he calls the "Office of the Keys" or penance. This consists of three parts: contrition or repentance, confession or admission of sin; and satisfaction or amendment. He uses Bonhoeffer as he does Mowrer to support his contention that there has been too much "cheap grace" and not enough emphasis that "faith without works

is dead." (Majes 2:26) -- and too little honest openness.

He is severely critical of the failure of the clergy and laity to demonstrate their own openness.

Perhaps it is part of the problem of unsuccessful therapy that the therapist or pastor expects the client or parishioner to be open and honest about his life while remaining professionally secretive about his own (Belgum, 1963, p. 128).

He regards it as the responsibility of the whole church to reverse the hypocrisy and to provide the kind of openness and honesty that would enable guilt to be purged.

Who else can operate competently in this vital ministry if not the clergy of the church and the chaplains that minister in our hospitals? What other point of view can handle this issue if not a theology which is aware of the problem of sin and which stands ready to deal effectively with the ravages of guilt? (Belgum, 1963, pp. 58-59).

There is a large measure of agreement between Mowrer and Belgum. The latter does not go all the way in counting sin as the universal cause of mental illness. He also adopts strongly theistic and Christian procedures to deal with guilt. However as he sees it the churches have abdicated their responsibility, do not regard guilt as significant, and have encouraged hypocrisy -- both by example and precept -- as they way to deal with sin rather than encourage openness.

All of this may make the church aware of how far it must travel before it can become, in his terms, a

credible therapeutic agency.

SOME ADDITIONAL CRITICISMS OF MOWRER'S POSITION

Real guilt is at the center of Mowrer's theory of personality disorder. Breach of contract, disruption of relationship with significant others caused by overt behaviour which contravenes the individual's conscience, the complications of hypocrisy, cheating -- these are the breeders of real guilt and the real cause of neurosis. Guilt is a concept that, for him, can be used as a connecting link between learning theory and psychotherapy. The cure can only be found by open confession to significant others and an adequate program of restitution.

This places the responsibility for recovery back on the neurotic individual. This individual must be accepted not rejected, and neither scolded nor abused for his sin. But will he be able to feel accepted for very long once the search for the offence begins?

When successful the procedure will lead to rapid therapy. The role of the therapist and the course of treatment are clearly defined. The "sufferer" is given a technique for returning to community and dealing with the future.

When successful it would appear to be very successful, but what happens when it is unsuccessful? What takes place when the "client" is unable or unwilling

to follow this route? Will his total situation not be much worse according to Mowrer's conceptualization? He will have added guilt to guilt and be further away from regaining community.

A further major criticism is that while at first sight Mowrer appears to be making a broad synthesis, his exclusiveness over sin and guilt presents a real frustration in understanding him. Is he as hard line on these issues as he sometimes professes?

At least some, perhaps many instances of psychopathology have their inception when a person has secretly breached a contract ... (Mowrer, 1969, p. 13).

Is it some or is it all? This is the heart of the whole issue and Mowrer is himself inconsistent. "Foolish consistency may be the hobgoblin of little minds." But the question here is who is foolish?

There was a strong reaction to Mowrer's two papers on Sin. The entire section called "Comment" in the November 1960 issue of the American Psychologist was devoted to criticism of Mowrer. It is interesting to note the almost entire absence of favourable comment. There were some issues raised in comment that Mowrer does not appear to have either noticed or attempted to rebut. Among these are the following:

Will the approach by Mowrer, in fact, deepen the individual's sense of worthlessness and make it even more difficult for that person to change?

Is not excessive guilt a real problem? What about those individuals who "leading outwardly blameless lives torture themselves constantly with accusations of sins"? Will not Mowrer's approach provide them with the rationalization they crave to avoid facing their real problems?

Surely few maintain that all man's behaviour is attributable to the unconscious, but neither can it be maintained that none of it is his (American Psychologist, 1961, p. 715).

The jury will be out for a long time on many of these questions and others that Mowrer provokes. Yet essentially he has recalled psychology to face seriously the moral and religious issues. It is quite clear that values and ethics are highly significant. Mowrer has powerfully provoked open discussion of this.

On the whole, Mowrer provides a clear answer to the cause of real guilt. This is the only kind of guilt he considers to be of serious concern. He provides a means of dealing with it. He regards the relationship of sin and guilt to be central. Even if he over-simplifies he raises a great human issue. What happens when an individual offends his conscience? Mowrer surely is correct, that reconciliation cannot take place until the offence has been openly acknowledged and the individual has committed himself to a constructive pattern of behaviour. There is ample evidence that when this takes place guilt is resolved.

CHAPTER III

THE BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ISSUES RAISED

BY MOWRER

INTRODUCTION

Mowrer is far from being the only psychologist who is taking an interest in religion, though he appears to be the "secular" psychologist who takes it most seriously. Or does he?

There appears to be a basic shift from the position of Freud as described by Mowrer. Freud, he says, considered Christianity "The enemy of all mankind" (Mowrer, 1961, p.112). However, there is by no means any unanimity regarding the role of the clergyman in relation to mental health. A few years ago the Edmonton branch of the Canadian MentalHealth Association distributed a book called Report No. 48, "Psychiatry and Religion: Some steps toward mutual understanding and usefulness." Among other things the authors stated,

The clergyman, when he talks to the psychiatrist about a case, should regard himself as an informed and influential layman, with no more authority and competence in the field of psychiatry than the psychiatrist has in the field of theology (Report No. 48, 1960, p. 347).

In spite of this the relevance of religion to this area of life is becoming more accepted. Traditionally

religion has been concerned with values and with guilt. Now that valid guilt is making a comeback and now that the issue of values is regarded by many as crucial, the interest in religion itself by psychologists has become quite pronounced. Before dealing with the specific relationship of religion and guilt it is interesting to note the place of religion for particular psychologists.

VIEWS ON RELIGION BY SOME CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS, INCLUDING MOWRER

Some views of the general relationship between religion and mental health are appropriate. One very important caution must be given. In many cases the words may mean something quite different from what they appear to mean. This has been noticed already with Meehl and Mowrer. They often have a purely "horizontal" dimension rather than a "vertical" -- to use Mowrer's terms. Mowrer and others use the word "horizontal" to mean man to man relationships, and "vertical" to mean man to God relations. What is perceived may not be and often is not what is meant. The importance of this will be seen later in a fuller discussion of Mowrer. Nevertheless, even with this caution, the statements made are significant.

Jung points out;

The individual who is not anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own resources to the physical and moral blandishments of the world. For this he needs the evidence of inner, transcendent

experience which alone can protect him from the otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass (Jung, 1958, p. 24).

He is very far from alone in these sentiments.

Rollo May defines religion as "the assumption that life has meaning" (May, 1953, p. 180). He continues:

When one is able to relate creatively to the wisdom of his fathers in the ethical and religious tradition he finds that he discovers anew his capacity to wonder (May, 1953, p. 181).

The importance of this to May is indicated by his belief that:

Wonder is a function of what one holds to be of ultimate meaning and value in life (May, 1953, p. 182).

Viktor Frankl has come to be strongly identified with a plea for a new look at the importance of religion. He believes that man is in trouble, in part because he has lost his religious traditions. He maintains that man's "spiritual aspirations ... should be taken at face value" (Frankl, 1967, p. 20).

There are a number of interesting comments in Severin's book, "Humanistic Viewpoints in Psychology." Turner states,

There are taboos in psychology and one of them seems to be the consideration of ultimate aims or ends (Severin, 1965, p. 306).

He states very emphatically that this cannot be acceptable. Psychology must be involved in a study of what is ultimate.

In the same volume Gilbert Wrenn pleads for the

integration of religion and psychology.

The postulate of this paper is that religion and psychology complement each other. Psychology contributes to an understanding of the nature of self and of one's relationships with others, religion to an understanding of meaning and purpose in life and the significance of these same relationships (Severin, 1965, p. 378).

Paul Tillich, who has tried to tie together the "secular" and the "sacred", finds the integration at the place of courage. "Every courage to be has openly or covertly a religious root" (Tillich, 1952, p. 148).

The pendulum has swung to the other extreme in the eyes of others. In "The Nature of Man" edited by Simon Doniger, Paul Tillich says,

The decisive question here is whether one believes it possible to remove by a successful analysis not only neurotic forms of anxiety but also its genuine forms -- the anxiety of finitude, of guilt, of emptiness (Doniger, 1962, p. 49).

Weigart responds to this by affirming that these issues cannot be dealt with outside a religious and, for her, a Christian framework.

The regaining of trust, the integration of wholeness, lie ultimately beyond psychotherapeutic endeavour. In the Christian religion, it is experienced as the Miracle of redemption (Doniger, 1962, p. 21).

David Belgum, while discouraged by how Christianity is functioning, sees in it real hope for dealing with troubled and guilty people. He focuses on the inadequacy of psychotherapy. It is not just a question of complementary

approach or of vague gestures towards religion made by the generous psychotherapist. There are areas in connection with valid guilt and ultimate meaning where only the Christian is able to be helpful.

Where does Mowrer fit into all this? Does he belong to any of all these viewpoints? Or does he have a unique point of view? Is there a development in his thought from a "supernatural" position to a "natural?" Or is he simply inconsistent because his thinking is not all done and the data is not all in?

There can be little question about the significance of religion for and in Mowrer. He rather wryly but approvingly endorses Robert's comment, "A psychologist who is suspected of being religious is at once under suspicion of scientific incompetence" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 12). In spite of this danger Mowrer proceeds to be religious.

Arising out of his conviction that:

Guilt is the central problem ... real, palpable, indisputable guilt.

He goes on:

Where neurosis or psychosis is purely functional (as it usually is), the individual, I believe, always has a hidden history of serious misconduct which has not been adequately compensated and "redeemed". And if this be so then confession, expiation, and a "new life in Christ" (or some equivalent type of conversion") have a practical pertinence which far exceeds the boundaries behind which some theologians have attempted to hold them (Mowrer, 1961, p. 57).

The specifically religious or Christian terms are confusion, expiation, and a new life in Christ and

conversion.

Mowrer was described by Newsweek as "the man who put sin back into psychology." He plainly states in this connection:

Just so long as we deny the reality of sin, we cut ourselves off, it seems, from the possibility of radical redemption (Mowrer, 1961, p. 40).

His detailed knowledge of theological terms can be illustrated by his use of the word "grace" and particularly "cheap grace". (Mowrer, 1961, pp. 190, 232). The Holy Spirit is the "unconscious" as reconstituted by Mowrer (1961, p. 103). The Wrath of God he regards as "the form in which those who defy Him experience His love" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 219). He refers to Primitive Christianity which for him "seems to have had many of the characteristics seen today in the small self help therapeutic groups" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 2). He discusses forgiveness and justification by faith in some considerable detail and we will come back to that later. He is by no means always complimentary. He describes the doctrine of substitutionary atonement and "the absolution of personal guilt by means of the doctrine psychologically inadequate and in need of critical reappraisal" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 145). He has endorsed the traditional Christian view of temptation and its relation to guilt "resistance to temptation but not guilt after yielding is positively related to mental health (Mowrer, 1968, p. 30).

MOWRER'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHRISTIANITY

Mowrer seems to have a love-hate relationship with Christianity. He makes a fierce indictment of Protestantism in general and Calvinism in particular. He chides "evangelical religion" with having sold out.

Has evangelical religion sold its birthright for a mess of psychological pottage? In attempting to rectify their disastrous early neglect of psychopathology, have the churches and seminaries assimilated a viewpoint and value system more destructive and deadly than the evil they were attempting to eliminate? As a psychologist and churchman, I believe the answer to these questions is in the affirmative (Mowrer, 1961, p. 60).

There is however a different feeling about his comments regarding the Christian Church from those attacking Freud. He speaks more in sorrow than in anger. He is a participant not an outsider. He sees real hope and in people like Boisen and Belgum a bright light. He expresses his indebtedness to people like Henry Van Dusen and Boisen for some of the ideas he has found personally helpful. It is in groups like "Faith at Work" that he sees real hope in the future. Taken at the human level the diagnosis and cure of guilt he proposes have their roots in the Bible which he uses extensively to expound and develop them. His vocabulary is also taken straight out of the Bible. Even though he is quite ambivalent and sometimes contradictory there seems little doubt that he intends to speak as a friend and constructive critic. He wishes to restore the

church to its earlier role as that of a therapeutic community.

His position regarding Christianity is, in this writer's understanding, quite different from how he regards Freud. The latter is doomed because Freud's essential position is in error and the practical implications are counter therapeutic. As far as Christianity is concerned if only it will return to its basic position, as Mowrer understands it, and implement it the consequences will be therapeutic.

The church has the resources to offer a healing corrective to the increasing breakdown of authentic community in our automated society. But it cannot be truly redemptive as long as it uses the doctrine of grace as a substitute for genuine encounter among its members, and between its members and the rest of society (Mowrer, 1964, p. 73).

It is not always clear whether Mowrer would do away with the whole man to God aspect of the Christian faith. At times he clearly would and this becomes more and more his inclination. There are, though, other affirmations he makes.

We do not for a moment imply that man is separate from or in any way transcends the Universal, the Divine, the godly or that what proves useful in guiding and shaping strong and durable human personalities can be at variance from valid revelation. A hospital chaplain whom I know tells me that in his chapel services he sometimes reminds patients that we do not 'break God's laws; they if we defy them break us' (Mowrer, 1964, p.146).

With whatever ambivalence and reservations he possesses, he is clearly committed, not only to a recognition of the failures of Christianity but to the possibilities for good.

Like many other people he looks back on the first four hundred years of the Christian era as the golden age.

For roughly the first four hundred years of the Christian era, i.e., throughout "Apostolic Times", personal confession was entirely or at least very commonly made in public, and penance was equally open and known. But during the fifth century, the church began to "seal" confession, that is to say, to make it, the sin involved, and the ensuing "justification" completely private (Mowrer, 1964, p. 18).

This process became complete by the time of the Reformation when both the penitents and the confessors were locked into a contract of silence. He believes that the reasons for this were largely economic. Unfortunately while the Reformation handled that part of the issue only

It has left us with no fully satisfactory means of dealing with personal guilt (Mowrer, 1964, p. 19).

Actually as Mowrer sees it the situation is even worse than that.

Protestant Christianity instills in us the capacity to experience guilt but with no personal resource or reliable possibility for alleviating it (Mowrer, 1961, p. 164).

In Mowrer's view the indictment goes even further. He believes that the consequence of this radical failure was that psychoanalysis came into being, with all, in

Mowrer's view, its attendant evils.

Many Christians, theologians and others would disagree with him regarding the all-inclusiveness of these statements. There is much to be said on the other side. There are other historical forces to take into consideration. Nevertheless the practical situation remains that guilt rather than freedom from it marks many of those who adhere to the faith that has for its central emphasis forgiveness, reconciliation and wholeness.

Literally millions of Protestants who have followed Reformation theology as exactly as they know how and still have found no relief from the onslaught of an aggrieved conscience (Mowrer, 1964, p. 174).

This in spite of the fact, as Mowrer persistently points out, that both the Old Testament and New Testament would persuade us to handle the whole issue of sin quite differently.

THE TEACHING OF THE BIBLE ABOUT SIN AND GUILT

Mowrer points out that in both Old and New Testament there is repeated admonition to "uncover" our sins to one another.

It is, in fact, interesting and important to note the openness with which "sin" is treated in the Bible. The account of Noah's drunkenness, Samson's moral attitudes, David's sin with Bathsheba and Uriah, Jacob's duplicity, are quite typical references. The Psalmist openly acknow-

ledges his anxiety, his doubt, his sins, as well as, his faith and joy. In the New Testament the strongest criticisms by Jesus were made against the Pharisee for his hypocrisy. Jourard and Belgum point out that this is essentially "lack of openness". It leads to alienation from oneself and from others. The denial by Peter, the outburst of temper by Paul, the failure of John Mark and the subsequent quarrel between Paul and Barnabas are all recorded openly. The exhortation is very plainly stated, "Confess your faults one to another" (James 5:16).

Mowrer quotes the passage from Luke 12:1-3:

Meanwhile, when a crowd of many thousands had gathered, packed so close that they were treading on one another, (Jesus) began to speak first to his disciples, 'Beware the leaven of the Pharisees; I mean their hypocrisy. There is nothing covered up that will not be uncovered, nothing hidden that will not be made known. You may take it, then, that everything you have said in the dark will be heard in broad daylight, and what you have whispered behind closed doors will be shouted from the housetops' (New English Bible).

Mowrer argues that this passage means that the guilt which:

Forms the core of neurosis will be 'admitted' involuntarily, 'symptomatically', if it has not previously been revealed to at least a few other persons and atoned for, in a conscious and deliberate way (Mowrer, 1964, p. 96).

In the writer's view it can scarcely be denied that there is a great deal of truth in Mowrer's contention. Many of those committed to the Christian faith have failed to acknowledge and practice its dynamics. If not by deliberate

intention they have, in fact, encouraged deviousness by discouraging confession and openness. The church has gone through periods in its history when it has been uninterested in human need and professed to be absorbed in the "vertical" when it has often been merely interested in itself as a political power. This criticism is valid. What of his views on Calvin and his influence? Are they valid also?

CALVIN AND JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH: DOES THIS INCREASE GUILT?

Mowrer sees in the Reformation doctrine of "Justification by Faith" a particular example of theology leading man astray. He reserves some of his strongest comments for Calvin who with Freud is, in his view, largely responsible for our present dilemma over guilt.

He blames Calvin for the rejection of the Judeo-Christian faith and in particular the turning away from Christ to Nietzsche, Freud and Zen.

His doctrine of predestination of human helplessness paved the way for the despair of Kierkegaard and the anger of Nietzsche (Mowrer, 1961, p. 24).

Justification by faith and justification by insight are just heads and tails of the same coin.

Protestant theology has preached a doctrine of "justification by faith". Place your trust in God and believe on Jesus Christ, we have been urged, and your sins will be immediately forgiven. And for those who prefer a

"scientific" rather than a "religious" approach, there has been the doctrine of "justification by insight". In the latter approach, one comes to see that his sins are not real and that he doesn't really need forgiveness. It is hard to determine which of these doctrines has been the more pernicious (Mowrer, 1961, p. 232).

While this, in the writer's view, represents an extreme and unbalanced view of Calvin he makes the same point again and again. He is very unwilling to accept any distinction between Calvin and Calvinism. He replies to those who would make such a distinction,

I must confess that I am not greatly concerned about the understanding of Calvin himself. What is important for our purpose is the widespread popular conception (Mowrer, 1961, p. 165).

This may not satisfy the theologian or the historian but it may be legitimate within the limits he sets down. Calvinism along with Freudianism and Behaviourism are the arch enemies for Mowrer. They do not deliver man from his guilt, they increase his bondage.

If the doctrines of Luther and Calvin disposed the Western world to 'Christian despair', those of Freud and Watson have, it seems, engulfed us in a despair that is infinitely deeper and more absolute (Mowrer, 1964, p. 9).

Mowrer regards Paul as the inspiration behind Calvin's error in opposing "works". He takes an interesting plunge into New Testament criticism and sets up James and Paul in opposition, making at the same time a cut at the fundamentalist. The Fundamentalists are the Christian

group most strongly committed to the authority and inspiration of the Bible.

Fundamentalists, literalists, and revelationists sometimes make a great point of the internal consistency of the Bible. One need not be a Biblical expert to know that James was in direct and emphatic disagreement with Paul (Mowrer, 1961, p. 188).

There has been a good deal of theological ink spilt over that issue. The conclusions are often more a product of the assumptions made than the evidence set forth. It is a pity that Mowrer spends so much time on issues like this. The basic problem here is semantic. Many New Testament scholars regard the difference between Paul and James as simply a matter of definition. For Paul faith includes both belief and conduct, for James faith is belief only. Regardless of which side is correct it does not improve Mowrer's case to state one side of it so dogmatically.

The basic contention that Paul and Calvinism fail to meet human need and indeed deepen man's sense of guilt without offering real remedies is serious enough without the distractions of a theological argument about real or supposed difference between James and Paul.

This claim by itself would be strenuously denied. Charles A. Curran points out:

David in the Jewish tradition and Paul and Augustine in the Christian tradition could be held up as classic examples of people who

admitted having committed very grave sins and yet as sinners, recognized their own worth in God's forgiveness and redemption (Curran, 1960, p. 193).

What does seem valid to point out is that in Paul's teaching the ideas of confession and restitution are not focused on as clearly as Mowrer feels they ought to be. The defence of this could be made that, by example, Paul was very open about his sins (the chief of sinners) and quite clearly after his experience on the road to Damascus set about on a major program of restitution. It should also be noted that within the churches founded by Paul all the dynamics outlined by Mowrer were clearly practised. The letters to the Church at Corinth are full of exhortations to contrition, confession, restitution and restoration.

MOWRER'S VIEWS ON THE FAILURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY CHURCH

He is clearly aware of the difference of viewpoint within the Protestant church in North America. He goes on to attack the leaders of the non-Fundamentalist and non-Calvinist churches.

Today there are literally thousands of ministers who are under the spell of Tillich, Fosdick, and the other Freudian apologists They turn to Freud because they have lost their own integrity and anchorage. If religious leaders had been deeply involved in the care and redemption of seriously disturbed persons for the past century, instead of

systematically "referring" such persons, there would have been no Freud and no necessity for a Tillich or a Fosdick to try to legitimize him (Mowrer, 1961, p. 171).

There can be little doubt of the substantial accuracy of this comment as far as its criticism of the church's failure is concerned. The local Canadian Mental Health Association organized a workshop for Edmonton clergy and invited a local psychiatrist to speak. The chief topic of concern on the part of the ministers was to get an answer to the question, "When do I refer?" It was accepted that areas of mental and emotional illness were out of their "field" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 171).

Mowrer blames this on the church.

Challenge a parish minister or a seminary professor to stay with, rather than "refer" a person suffering from a severe personality crisis, and what is the typical rejoinder: "But I'm not qualified for that sort of thing!" The fact is, such a minister is not qualified. Because the church does not concern itself with the one genuinely lost sheep, the whole congregation is eventually lost; and the minister himself goes into 'therapy' with the same would-be secular healers to whom he has been referring others (Mowrer, 1961, p. 171).

Whatever arguments the church may advance to excuse this situation can only indict it more. Mowrer's contention that the minister must return to "the fully pledged business of saving, rescuing, and redeeming others", can surely not be denied.

This total indictment of Christianity may be provocative, activist and biased as Mowrer often admits

to being. Yet it has too much plain truth in it to be denied. Christianity has often aroused guilt without giving people any help in handling it. It has failed often to apply its own dynamics. It has encouraged "hypocrisy" rather than an openness and stimulated deviousness. It has surrendered the whole area of emotional anguish and been preoccupied with referring rather than redeeming. It is, at least, encouraging that he can still see the church exercising a healing ministry.

Having recognized the validity of the points that he has made it must be pointed out that the issues dividing Mowrer and many within the Christian church are deep and certainly for many Christians unbridgeable. In spite of some views expressed to the contrary there is a deep undercurrent of naturalism in him. So much so that there are grounds for believing that what is held in common is more a common vocabulary than common ideas or meanings.

Mowrer can state very clearly,

As an active churchman, I believe that the concept of God is vital and meaningful and that the so-called 'vertical dimension' between God and man, is vital and meaningful (Mowrer, 1961, p. 110).

He goes on to add:

I do not believe that this relationship can be either vital or meaningful if it is not complemented, and indeed, often preceded by serious concern on the part of the individual with the horizontal dimension, namely the relation of man to man (Mowrer, 1961, p. 110).

This establishes clear common ground on which all Christians would unite. He quotes a minister as asking and answering the question.

Do we get strength from our religion? Indeed we do, for it is our obedience to Christ which enables us to accept each other as sinners, to find reconciliation in front of the cross which judges every man, and to be open to that love which is more than we are (Mowrer, 1964, p. 83).

Yet, at the same time he tells of the conflict he found himself involved in at the Pocono Conference.¹ He objected vigorously to the way in which the Faith at Work program was "radically Christocentric". There seem to be two attitudes struggling within Mowrer. The one which is committed to a fairly traditional "hard line" type of Christianity. The other which rejects the "vertical dimension" almost altogether.

He explains and justifies his "Christian" vocabulary as follows:

As the conception of psychopathology which is delineated in this paper developed, it was very easy to drop into the practice of using terms such as "hypocrisy", "guilt", "sin", "confession", "restitution", etc. There was, in fact, no other established and widely understood vocabulary in which to refer to the underlying phenomenon. And when one digs back into the history of the church, it becomes clear that I.T. (Integrity Therapy) principles are not new but have, in bygone centuries, been well understood and put into effective practice by religious groups There is, however, a basic difficulty: because I have

¹This was a conference of the Faith at Work movement attended by Mowrer.

often used religious or quasi-religious language, my writings have claimed the attention of clergymen; but since they are basically naturalistic, rather than super-naturalistic, in orientation, they have also been the target of much concern and criticism (Mowrer, 1967, p. 26).

Were it not for his previous ambivalence, this could be regarded as clear proof of his rejection of basic Christianity in its theological expression. At the very least, it indicates a clear bias in that direction. This is confirmed in his distinction between what he calls theistic models over against religious models. He rejects the former and embraces the latter.

I have spoken of the theistic rather than a religious model because the two are not at all the same to my way of thinking (Mowrer, 1969, p. 37).

He regards the religious model as meaning "a binding together, reconciliation" and therefore quite compatible.

The hostility expressed towards the "Christocentric" aspects of Faith at Work, the explanation for the use of his vocabulary, the explicit emphasis on the "naturalistic" rather than the "supernatural" and the preference for the religious rather than the theistic, taken along with the greater absence of Christian references in his latest publications would all suggest that rather than Mowrer representing a step towards a rapprochement with Christianity he is himself greatly losing any enthusiasm for it.

THE INADEQUACY OF MOWRER'S VIEW OF FORGIVENESS AND GRACE

Mowrer reacts on the whole negatively to the concept of forgiveness. An exception to this is a recent statement, writing of the challenge of religious concepts and terms. He says,

Although we seem to be moving away from traditional theology, there is nevertheless much in religion that is humanly important and meaningful - and which challenges the Behavioural Sciences in very significant ways. The concept of "forgiveness" is a case in point (Mowrer, 1967, p. 28).

It is this kind of inconsistency that makes it so difficult to be sure one understands what Mowrer is saying. More typically, he recounts an incident over what he describes as an unfortunate remark made by him to a woman of his acquaintance. It caused her embarrassment and him remorse. He recalls that he didn't attempt any sort of apology, and she never said anything in the way of forgiveness.

However though nothing was said, he gathered that she had forgiven him "but this made my guilt and remorse even greater, not less" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 196). This incident led him to analyze whether in fact forgiveness was either possible or desirable.

How can another, either in a religious or purely personal setting, forgive us? The misdeed, the sin is ours Forgiveness in the usual sense of the term is, I feel, an act of great condescension and not at all

likely to restore our self-respect or peace of mind (Mowrer, 1964, p. 196).

In a fuller discussion he quotes an incident mentioned by Meehl of the girl who had stolen from a "dime store", been to confession, and had forgiveness and absolution pronounced. This had not helped the girl who had required professional help. It illustrates to Mowrer the "inadequacy of the simple formula of confession and assurance of divine forgiveness." But does it invalidate forgiveness any more than it invalidates confession? Surely not. In this particular case it was felt that "she had unexpressed misgivings about whether God had actually forgiven her after her previous confessions" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 197).

A central difficulty in the matter of forgiveness for Mowrer is his fear that it prevents the person who is experiencing guilt from recognizing their personal responsibility for sin and the need for confession, restitution and reformation. It is destructive because it lets the sinner off too easily for his own good.

Forgiveness or 'understanding' is a wonderful, redemptive thing; but too often it is interpreted as meaning that the deviant individual doesn't need to be "accountable" or "pay" for his defalcations (Mowrer, 1964, p. 136).

Is this any more than what we have to say about repentance or confession or restitution? Each of these things if treated as if they are all there is involved in restoration to community, are not only inadequate, but

dangerous.

The value he sees in forgiveness is much more in terms of what it does for the person who does the forgiving rather than any help it may be to the person being forgiven.

In forgiveness the offended person says, in effect, that he is not going to take revengeful action against the offender. This means that the offended person has given up his resentment, hostility, 'grudge' - states of mind which can be very destructive and costly to the individual displaying them. That forgiveness frees the offender is doubtful; that it frees the offended, in a human and 'clinically' important way, seems very likely (Mowrer, 1967, p. 27).

There has been strong exception taken to his whole viewpoint here. He himself notes the criticism of Klassen.

What Mowrer has to say about confession and restitution has psychological value. What he has to say about sin and forgiveness is not only shallow and unknowledgeable but actually dangerous (Klassen, 1966, p. 218).

Klassen argues that the Christian church has never taught that forgiveness meant an undoing of the past or was a cheap method of getting off easily.

It is precisely because no violation of justice can be allowed that Christ needed to suffer. Just as we today continue to bear the sufferings of our fellow-men as we comprise the Body of Christ, the church, so no forgiveness is possible without suffering (Klassen, 1966, p. 219).

A more careful study of what is meant by forgiveness would have been more helpful. Vincent Taylor discusses some of the definitions of forgiveness given by modern theologians. The word modern must be understood as it would be expressed

by theologians rather than psychologists. One of these definitions goes back to 1914! He quotes W. H. Moberly, "the full restoration of delicate personal relations between friends or between parent and child." William Temple, "to forgive is to restore the old relationship." R. S. Franks, "a restoration of the sinner to communion with God; it is the breaking down of the barriers between them." R. N. Flew: "It implies a personal relationship, violated and now restored" (Taylor, 1958, p. 1).

Is not this the end to which Mowrer is committed? Forgiveness speaks of restoration to community, openness of relationships, reconciliation with significant others. The process involves repentance, restitution and reformation. The action of God is to act as a spur, an example and the means to that end. Indeed Vincent Taylor maintains that the New Testament and particularly the Gospels are even more concerned with forgiveness as it relates from man to man than with man to God.

He acknowledges that there is something of a gap between forgiveness as it is in the New Testament and its significance in modern theology.

Whereas in the former it denotes the removal of the barriers to reconciliation, in the latter it signifies full restoration to fellowship. We forgive the wrong doer when by the actions of love we repair the broken fellowship and re-establish it upon strong and enduring foundations (Taylor, 1948, p. 23).

The word forgiveness covers not only the idea of

acceptance but of Christian growth and good living.

It embraces the entire process of Christian growth and development, and is at once a possession and a hope, an earnest and a fulfillment (Taylor, 1948, p. 24).

It is clear that, at least, some of the difficulty lies in Mowrer's failure to recognize that reconciliation and forgiveness are not separate concepts. As Vincent Taylor points out modern theologians tie them together and almost, in fact, make them identical. Mowrer seems unaware of this.

In both the Old and New Testament there is ample precept as well as precedent for a ministry of human reconciliation (rather than mere divine forgiveness); and it is here, in the realm of disturbed and restored human relations, that psychology and religion have, I believe, their brightest chances for genuine collaboration (Mowrer, 1964, p. 237).

Taylor points out that this is indeed a major emphasis in the Gospels. It is clearly in Paul who speaks of Christians being "ministers of reconciliation". It is central to the modern idea in theology of what the nature of forgiveness is. The quarrel is in part semantic and in part that Mowrer looks, quite rightly, at what the culture sees Christianity as being rather than how Christianity likes to think it should be seen. In any event forgiveness is not something apart that is conferred. It is something that involves all the things Mowrer himself emphasizes. SIN - GUILT - CONTRITION - CONFESSION AND RESTITUTION.

MOWRER'S TENDENCY TO REACT INADEQUATELY AGAINST
CHRISTIAN IDEAS

Mowrer undoubtedly lays himself wide open to criticism because he seems to react emotionally and inconsistently when it comes to Christian ideas. He makes sweeping statements which end up by appearing only to be pretentious. In his references to Luther and Calvin he appears only to be acquainted with one book by Luther and none by Calvin. Yet he can say,

I, personally, take my stand with the Apostle James and Dietrich Bonhoeffer against the Apostle Paul and Martin Luther (Mowrer, 1961, p. 109).

Then he adds,

Or at least against the extreme interpretations sometimes put upon their teaching (Mowrer, 1961, p. 109).

It might very well have amused Bonhoeffer to find himself arrayed against Luther! In *The Cost of Discipleship*, Bonhoeffer goes to great length to distinguish between Luther and his followers. Mowrer quotes from this book and from the same chapter but does not appear to have noticed this aspect.

It is a fatal misunderstanding of Luther's action to suppose that his rediscovery of the gospel of pure grace offered a general dispensation from obedience to the command of Jesus (Bonhoeffer, 1964, p. 40).

Or again,

When he spoke of grace, Luther always implied as a corollary that it cost him his own life, the life which was now for the first time subjected

to the absolute obedience of Christ (Bonhoeffer, 1964, p. 41).

The recognition of grace was his final, radical breach with his besetting sin, but it was never the justification of that sin (Bonhoeffer, 1964, p. 42).

It would be more appropriate for Mowrer to take his stand with Luther and Bonhoeffer rather than to set them in opposition to each other. This kind of selective quotation is undesirable as well as inaccurate. It is all the more surprising because Mowrer quotes a great deal of other material in the particular chapter where these positive comments on Luther are contained and can hardly be unaware of them. To combine praise of Bonhoeffer along with rejection of Luther is incomprehensible.

Mowrer regards Bonhoeffer as having significant contributions to make. He particularly likes Bonhoeffer's emphasis on the value of confession in restoring the person to community. "He who is alone with his sin is utterly alone (Mowrer, 1961, p. 191; 1961, p. 147; 1964, p. 89).

He thoroughly endorses the statement by Bonhoeffer.

The pious fellowship permits no one to be a sinner. So everybody must conceal his sin from himself and from the fellowship. We dare not be sinners. Many Christians are unthinkingly horrified when a real sinner is suddenly discovered among the righteous (Mowrer, 1964, p. 89).

There is basic agreement on this point by Bonhoeffer, Belgum, Meehl and Mowrer.

The other emphasis by Bonhoeffer stressed by Mowrer

is on "cheap grace".

Cheap grace means the justification of sin without the justification of the sinner (Bonhoeffer, 1964, p. 35).

Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness without requiring repentance, baptism without church discipline. Communion without confession, absolution without personal confession. Cheap grace is grace without discipleship, grace without the cross, grace without Jesus Christ, living and incarnate (Bonhoeffer, 1964, p. 36).

Once again it must be emphasized that while Bonhoeffer and Mowrer may be agreed about the diagnosis they are not agreed about the remedy. In neither his ideas about confession or grace does Bonhoeffer commit himself to the "horizontal" or "naturalistic" approach basically favoured by Mowrer. He is in fact as Christocentric as the Faith at Work movement. He is deeply committed to Jesus Christ. His major objection to "cheap grace" is what it does to the spiritual lives of those it has corrupted. There are "millions of spiritual corpses in our country today" (Bonhoeffer, 1964, p. 45).

He goes on,

This cheap grace has been no less disastrous to our own spiritual lives. Instead of opening up the way to Christ it has closed it. Instead of calling us to follow Christ, it has hardened us in our disobedience (Bonhoeffer, 1964, p. 46).

There is no ambivalence in Bonhoeffer at this point. There is little doubt that what he regards as spiritual life is much more important than any other dimension.

Is Mowrer's view of sin, in fact, Christian? There

is reason to ask this even if at first sight such a question appears absurd. Is not Mowrer known far and wide as the man who put sin back into psychology? But the real question is what does he, in fact, consider the nature of sin to be. This is a question much easier to ask than to answer. We are confronted once again by apparent if not real inconsistencies and the use of a word that appears to identify Mowrer with the Christian cause but is used by him in at least some senses that are contrary to it.

Mowrer points out that:

Sin used to be - and in some quarters, still is - defined as whatever one does that puts him in danger of going to Hell (Mowrer, 1961, p. 42).

He accepts this definition except that Hell is the "Hell of neurosis and psychosis -- to which sin and unexpiated guilt lead us" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 42). Regardless of the defects he himself notes in the definition it could not be regarded as Christian in the sense in which he uses the term himself. It is not theistic and it is "naturalistic" rather than "supernatural". It is "horizontal" rather than "vertical".

A further difficulty in his attitude towards sin has been noted. Sin is only sin when one conceals the offence, it is only destructive when restitution does not take place. The first of these is a strange doctrine. Why is it sin? Is it that the central issue is not wrong doing but to hide one's wrong doing? He comes very close here to the

doctrine of Luther's which he criticizes so severely -- "Sin Boldly".

Mowrer wishes to be very specific about what sin is. However it usually ends up as a violation of social contract. He reacts against a particular sermon which emphasized sin as "the wilful violation of a personal relationship." The preacher maintained that "we don't sin against rules, we sin against persons" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 185). Is sin just something a person does? Is it not also what a person is? Is it not both? In the writer's view it is both.

He takes a few side swipes at "Original Sin" and "Total Depravity". Rather amusingly he maintains that he has been asked to comment on these, is unwilling to do so because he would be practicing theology "without a licence", then goes on to say, "This doctrine is nonsense - and has done much harm in the world!" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 147). Yet Mowrer has another side to him. He quotes extensively from Scripture and even speaks favourably of the "Wrath of God".

God is very much with us, indeed, and it behooves us to seek Him out in friendlier terms, that we may be spared knowing Him only in His Wrath and Vengeance (Mowrer, 1961, p. 154).

Sin therefore if this were a consistent view would obviously involve a strongly theistic element. He adds to this impression by quoting extensively from Psalm 139 and

Francis Thompson's poem, "The Hound of Heaven":

All things betray thee, who betrayest me.

Klassen takes exception to Mowrer's view of sin describing it as "totally inadequate". Curran has a much less hostile view of sin. "Sin is always a failure to love." He quotes Aquinas, "The sinner does not love himself enough." He denies the equation of sin and worthlessness pointing out that people like David, Paul and Augustine admitted very grave sins "and, yet, as sinners recognized their own worth in God's forgiveness and redemption" (Curran, 1960, p. 193).

Curran's conclusion is two-fold. First, that "love -- not sin -- is the real basis of the central Judaeo-Christian theological tradition" (Curran, 1960, p. 193). Second, "What sins a patient or client has committed are not the issue, but his willingness to love again and to let himself be forgiven and forgive himself" (Curran, 1960, p. 193).

There is serious reason to doubt whether even at his most-warm towards Christianity position Mowrer reflects adequately the Christian view of sin.

There is a real affinity in the recognition of the positive value in the recognition of sin and accepting responsibility for one's own sins (Mowrer, 1964, p. 129). There is basic agreement of the assistance this can bring to moving towards "radical redemption". There is common

acceptance that real guilt arises out of real sin. There is some agreement on the appropriateness of therapy, yet there is radical disagreement with the notion that sin and guilt are tied together as completely as Mowrer would insist. In answer to the question, "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?" Jesus answered quite bluntly, "Neither" (John 9:2). The purpose of the Book of Job in the Old Testament was to deny this contention by Mowrer. In this case Scripture is much more understanding and merciful than the psychologist! A much more adequate discussion from a Christian viewpoint is contained in Meehl's book with which Mowrer is familiar. He points out that when the Christian church speaks of sin "the meaning of the term is far more profound and comprehensive than its superficial usage in contemporary speech or literature" (Meehl, 1958, p. 50).

Sin is no more social offence or error which may be remedied by better training. A vastly deeper insight is offered by Martin Luther. "We are not sinners because we commit this or that sin, but we commit them because we are sinners first" (Meehl, 1958, p. 50/1).

The issue is not so much which of these is correct. There would have to be agreed criteria before that argument could be settled. The point is that in the light of Mowrer's more recent denial of the "supernatural", "theism", "Original Sin" and his affirmation of Contract Psychology the difference is there. Sin is violation of contract according to Mowrer. Contract "is an interpersonal, social

arrangement voluntarily entered into by the contracting parties" (Mowrer, 1969, p. 22). Under Mowrer's terms you can reduce or eliminate your sins by reducing or agreeing to alter your contracts. Obviously if sin is of the nature defined by Meehl it will not be possible to cope with it adequately by human dynamics. If sin is to be defined in relation to God, its solution must also have reference to Him. A person could fulfil all his contracts and still be a sinner.

It is hardly possible to reconcile these two views. Meehl could accommodate most of Mowrer but not the other way round. Meehl's viewpoint could place the cure for sin in any comprehensive sense beyond the reach of the psychotherapist, amateur or professional. It is contrary to Meehl's whole commitment to the view that sin consists of

Acts which he (the individual) has committed and wishes he had not (Mowrer, 1961, p. 26).

It must be further pointed out that the view of sin as consisting of actions only is emphatically rejected in the Sermon on the Mount. It views sin as residing in the "heart". This includes the imagination. The sin of adultery is not just a physical relationship but made to include, "looking on a woman to lust after her." It remains to add that Mowrer's view of redemption places little or no value on the CROSS which in the view of the very writers he quotes with approval is central. Bonhoeffer

(1964, p. 37), Meehl and Belgum much more clearly reflect the Christian position at this point.

There are serious objections to his view of sin. At one end of the continuum it is punitive, at the other end he regards it as a "mistake" or that it is not sin at all but failure to sin openly that is destructive and to be avoided. It is probably very difficult to be thoroughly consistent. The problem in discussing Mowrer is that he puts his concepts in black and white and is rarely tolerant of the ambiguity of others. The further difficulty is that his whole position is that real sin is the cause of all guilt. He does not leave himself much room for inconsistency.

MOWRER'S ATTRACTION TO THE MORE "HOSTILE" IDEAS OF CHRISTIANITY

The comparison made between Mowrer's view of sin and that of Curran (Curran, 1960, p. 193) and Meehl (Meehl, 1958, pp. 234-5) provides some evidence that Mowrer is attracted towards the most hostile ideas of Christianity. His fascination with the Wrath of God is a further example, as is his preference for Judgment rather than Justification, his rejection of forgiveness and his negative ideas about the atonement which he calls among other things an 'ambiguous and bloody doctrine' (Mowrer, 1961, p. 188).

It is for these reasons that some of the more

influential members of the Pastoral Psychology movement react with caution. It is not altogether because they have "sold out" to the Freudians. Hiltner comments:

As I have encountered many kinds of sufferers, over the years, I see people, people, who according to the Mowrer formula, must come clean and confess, but I also see other persons so victimized that "confession" would be a travesty (Hiltner, 1965, p. 7).

Stein who has laid himself more open than others to the accusation of Mowrer nevertheless makes a vital point when he states:

The single most critical factor in relating to the guilt laden person is acceptance. For real or neurotic reasons, or both, he cannot accept himself (Stein, 1968, p. 162).

Mowrer pays lip service to this but it never comes across as significant. Yet the further question has to be asked whether acceptance is the means or the end. The way of Christ was to be able to proceed from acceptance to enable the individual to make progress. Acceptance was the means but not the end. The end was the restored, reconciled, fully functioning individual at peace with himself, with God, and others.

The opposition to Mowrer is therefore more broadly based than he perceives. It includes the clinical experience of others, an awareness of the complexities of the cause of guilt, the conviction of the necessity for a stronger emphasis on acceptance, as well as a different view of the "new man in Christ". It is also questionable

whether Mowrer has given adequate sampling of Biblical passages where guilt is involved.

Mowrer reacts against those whom he calls "the literalists". He has some knowledge of those he describes as "evangelical". He has little or no affection for the "liberals". He is very resistant to Krimmel who wished to revise the Ten Commandments, particularly to dispose of the ninth.

Such a proposal is, in effect, an open invitation to disregard the other nine (Mowrer, 1964, p. 63).

In typical ambivalence on Christian issues he goes on to give the assurance that he is quite happy to give up laws that have "out-lived their usefulness".

We have noticed the extent and range of his Biblical knowledge. A further basic question here is whether he is right in his views of guilt and shame when measured by the classic Biblical accounts of such instances. He regards the Bible as a "superb handbook on human relations" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 65). Does it in fact confirm his distinction between guilt and shame?

The distinction turns on being caught in transgression. It is shame when one is caught, it is guilt when anxiety is real "In the absence of external knowledge or detection" (Mowrer, 1969, pp. 11, 12). Yet in the classic cases of the Bible it is shame that would appear to predominate. There appears to be little evidence of anxiety

in Adam and Eve until the Lord God appeared and called for them. In his relations with Esau and Laban, Jacob showed no sense of uneasiness until he found himself in a situation where his life was imperiled by their possible violence towards him. The situation of David is a little more complex. He had remained home while the battle was on. He coveted and took Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah, the Hittite. He arranged for the incident that led to the death of Uriah in battle. He took Bathsheba as his wife and we have no evidence of any discontent until Nathan the prophet confronted him with "Thou art the Man". From what evidence we possess the denial of Jesus by Peter fits a similar pattern. It was only when Jesus looked at him that Peter "went out and wept bitterly".

In fact it could be argued that Judas Iscariot is one of the few people who exhibited guilt as Mowrer defines it. The betrayal of Jesus led to his suicide. Even here there were other factors involved. Was it guilt or was it shame caused by his feelings of rejection by the other members of the band of the disciples?

There is certainly evidence that the uncovering of sins, confession and restitution were part of these incidents. The death of the child born to David and Bathsheba, the life commitment of the others are some evidence for this.

Mowrer's own discussion of this is interesting. He states that the:

Old Testament writers interpreted their own and their fellowmen's emotional anguish as a manifestation of the 'wrath of God' (Mowrer, 1961, p. 28).

Rather surprisingly he includes a quotation from Job to illustrate it. Whatever may be argued about the particular quotation (Job, 19:21) the whole purpose of the book of Job is to affirm the opposite. Its major theme is that suffering is no necessary sign of God's anger. He is on safer ground in his reference to Nebuchadnezzar but whether there are grounds for believing that this person returned from his "madness" to a life of "responsible living, integrity, and concern and compassion for others," (Mowrer, 1961, p. 31) is, at least, open to question.

We can argue that there is not enough data to come to a decisive conclusion whether it was shame or guilt. It could be claimed that the "Divine Being" who appeared and brought the crisis to a head was "conscience". But whatever one argues it is clear that this distinction between shame and guilt is not easily borne out by reference to the Bible. It may still be a "superb handbook in human relations" but it does not automatically endorse Mowrer's diagnosis of the causes or cures of neurosis.

MOWRER'S VIEW OF THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THERAPY

Mowrer speaks with at least three voices on this matter. The first is pessimism. The whole of the Pastoral

Counselling Movement has been corrupted, the seminaries are converted to Freud and the modern clergyman is inhibited and even countertherapeutic. The second is optimism. He reviews Christianity's early beginnings and sees in some contemporary expressions of it bright hope. The third voice dismisses "theism", the "vertical", "supernaturalism", the "atonement" and forgiveness as obsolete. These are not, of necessity, contradictory.

As Mowrer sees it the Pastoral Counselling Movement began out of an awareness of the failure of the church at that time to meet man's psychological and emotional needs. Boisen made valiant efforts to keep it within the traditional Judaeo-Christian ethic. However largely because of the influence of Fosdick he failed. The idea that the individual sickens in "mind and soul, not from sin but from the very excess of piety" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 72) became predominant. The movement is a greater sense of confusion because of the evidence that the Freudian position is inadequate. Having sold their birthright in this manner they are in a very awkward position. They can go neither back nor forward.

The consequence of this for the individual minister is quite obvious.

In his own eyes as well as those of others, he is clearly a second or third hand operator in this field (Mowrer, 1961, p. 74).

Reference has already been made to the tragedy this represents. This desertion of basic Christianity has paved the way for the rationalization of the Freudians. It has deepened man's guilt and progress will only be made when the minister quits referring and returns "to the full pledged business of saving, rescuing, and redeeming others" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 171).

Mowrer outlines what the church must do. It must recognize the clear connection between sin and guilt. It must make opportunity available for confession and outline programs of restitution.

He is convinced that it must encourage the "priesthood of all believers" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 236). For him this is the alternative to the use of the professional psychotherapist who is, in Mowrer's view, a person a patient buys in order to have "a paid for experience at being and becoming onself, with a professional expert who is unafraid of your unfolding being and of his own" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 236). The expert, incidentally, if he encourages "private confession" frustrates the healing process, in Mowrer's view.

He further believes that a far more effective way of encouraging faith is for those who have discovered "openness and personal transparency" to become the therapists.

Anyone who himself has been in this sense 'born again' can be a 'therapist', without being, by any means, a 'professional' expert (Mowrer, 1961, p. 236).

He goes on to point out that:

The genius of the self help group movement is that it is made up of amateurs, laymen - who, out of gratitude for their own reconciliation and redemption, are willing to be of assistance to others, freely and gladly (Mowrer, 1961, p. 236).

The Christian Church is in a particularly good situation to be that kind of "group movement". Mowrer notes the wide extent of this happening in the contemporary church. Through these groups the church becomes again "a therapeutic community". He reminds Christians that the communist has stolen this idea from them and this accounts largely for their success (Mowrer, 1964, p. 19). The Faith at Work movement apart from its "radical Christocentric" nature appeals to him. The "Pocono Conference" meant much to him as an example of how Christianity can function and is functioning. The group takes "personal guilt" seriously. It makes

... active use of confession and restitution in its attempt, to use its own terminology, 'to meet the needs of the people', to 'free' them personally and restore them to community (Mowrer, 1964, p. 21).

The central emphasis was on the recurrent testimony of persons who had been in sin and misery and who were now, as a result of a new policy of openness and restitution, rediscovering a sense of at-one-ment and were in or entering a period of serenity and joy (Mowrer, 1964, p. 21).

In so very many ways this exemplifies the dynamics he adheres to. The question, however, must be raised as

to whether his perception of the need to dispose of the "Christo-centric" issue would not in the perception of those involved have prevented them from reaching the point in their lives that he saw as so desirable.

From the Christian viewpoint the issue he raised with the Faith at Work group is not peripheral but central. There seems to be a clear paradox here. The Christian Church as it has in the main understood itself over the past almost two thousand years would cease to be if it became only what he suggests it become. He would reduce it to a secular organization. This point is made even more emphatically in a very recent paper where his major concern is to expound contract psychology.

When a contract is breached, in whatever way, a reunion or healing of the breach is to be devoutly desired. This, surely, is the essence of the religious enterprise, which may or may not be theistic in its presuppositions and overtone (Mowrer, 1969, p. 37).

It may be the essence of contract psychology. It is not the essence of Christianity. In the writer's view the whole issue cannot be reduced to contract psychology. At the same time a church indifferent to human need can have nothing in common with its founder or its Bible. It may be unable to take on such tasks as Mowrer suggests and "take mental hospitals as a major missionary effort" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 79) but it had better become increasingly a body of believers who seek to see men and women delivered from suffering and brought into real reconciliation, openness

and freedom.

It would do well for the Christian Church to ask what its part has been in the increase of emotional anguish. Why is it, Mowrer asks, that people are turning from Christ with "the outspread arms and open countenance" to Buddha with the "arms folded, eyes closed, and countenance inscrutable" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 241). Is it not, he argues, at least, in some measure because we have made "a fool of God" and divorced him from life and the relief of guilt and meeting the needs of people? It can be argued that there are general forces in the world leading to the fragmentation and alienation of life. The "turning away" from the institutional church is part of a whole revolt against authority. But if the church was what it professes to be, and what it could be, would it not be part of the solution and not just part of the problem.

Mowrer's own comment at this point is surely fair and reasonable.

If the church is so rigid and fixated that it cannot act as a physician to itself, the necessary accommodations and changes must be made, as before, outside the Church (Mowrer, 1961, p. 208).

There are many issues of possible contention here. However it is clear that "metaphysical assumptions" often cannot be the level at which one begins. There is considerable evidence that Jesus began with people where they were. The Christian question is whether total healing and

reconciliation can take place without reference to the significant other and without some reference to ultimate questions.

Hiltner's comment is wise:

He (Mowrer) is an able, honest, intelligent man, who has taken a good and interior look at our faith and found it wanting; on some grounds, perhaps mistakenly, but in others with a challenge we cannot ignore (Hiltner, 1965, p. 8).

GENERAL COMMENTS ON MOWRER AND CHRISTIANITY

As Hiltner has pointed out it is impossible to be neutral in relation to Mowrer. He has undoubtedly posed many uncomfortable questions to those who profess the Christian faith.

What is our procedure, he asks, for helping ourselves and other people to correct or make amends for what we have done wrong (or not done)? (Hiltner, 1965, p. 6).

Why is it that a group of people who profess to be against hypocrisy make no provision for real openness?

Is it not true that an obsession with the "vertical" can and has been used to avoid "genuine human encounter?"

What is the relationship between "Justification" and Works"?

What is the role of the church and minister in meeting emotional suffering?

On what grounds is anything right or wrong and what are the human consequences of the choices made?

To point out the inadequacies of Mowrer from a

Biblical and Theological point of view will not make these questions go away and can all too easily blind one to their reality. The one encouraging thing, from a Christian viewpoint, is that these questions are now being asked within some churches and seminaries. Real attempts are being made in the positive directions Mowrer indicates as desirable.

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL MEET ON THE ISSUE OF GUILT

INTRODUCTION

It is important to keep clearly in mind what Mowrer set out to accomplish. It was not some kind of objective, impersonal, empirical study. Arising out of intense personal disappointment over his own experience with psychoanalysis he began to look at it "critically but still sympathetically" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 182). He was both personally and professionally committed to find the causes and cure for guilt. The answers in his culture were supplied largely by Freud or Calvin and their followers.

He found neither of these adequate. He came to the conclusion that the core of anxiety was real guilt. This for him arose not out of over socialization but real transgression and could be purged only by confession to significant others and a program of restitution.

He has found himself focusing on the reality of sin and guilt, the value of confession and restitution.

REASONS FOR THE STRONG REACTIONS TO MOWRER

Some of the reaction to him has been noted. In all fairness it would have to be agreed that, at least, some of the strong reaction has been a function of some very fierce comments on his part. He does not scruple to describe the Christian idea of the atonement as an "ambiguous and bloody doctrine" (Mowrer, 1961, p. 188). His comments are that Calvinism has been responsible for "madness" and its implications are "a psychological and human absurdity and a Christian deviation and perversity" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 160). Such statements are hardly likely to win the sympathy of his critics.

Perry London has some insight to offer on at least part of the reason for the reaction to Mowrer.

Mowrer seems to have a genius for sensing the rawest intellectual nerve of his audience and then addressing himself to it in a manner that incites to riot. Deliberately and lucidly, he employs conventional theological language to describe thoroughly secular concepts, and they endeared to the clergy, then proceeds to assault choice parts of their theologies with gusto, wit and venom (London, 1964, p. 135)

One reaction to his paper, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology" (1968) was to say that the critic "noted a polemic tone". Mowrer reacts to this by offering a kind of apology "to those against whom the polemic may seem directed" (Mowrer, 1968, p. 77). Then he goes on to point out that there is some justice in

them being at the receiving end for a change.

For more than half a century, Freud and his followers, in the name of Science, have felt free to scorn and ridicule anything they chose, with little or no empirical data to support their attacks and criticism. Is it not singular that, as data have become available which bring their theoretical position sharply into question, they now cry: 'Polemic!' (Mowrer, Feb. 1968, p. 77).

In part also he admits to being "deliberately provocative, activistic and biased" (Mowrer, 1964, p. VII). By being this he feels that he has succeeded in stimulating thoughtful discussion!

It could be argued that his provocative style has prevented some from hearing all that he has to say. It has produced what Hiltner described as "uncritical adulation or throat cutting attack" (Hiltner, 1965, p. 5). The question really is whether a polite, unemotional, less loaded approach would have provoked any significant reaction. He has forced the psychotherapists, "secular" and "Christian", to review their positions. He has given the issue of values a thrust into the center of the stage.

MOWRER'S EMPHASIS ON MORAL VALUES

A major issue then for him is what happens when a person wilfully and secretly violates a moral contract he has made with significant others. The response of many others in the counselling field comes close to saying that this is an irrelevant issue. How could it be?

Albert Ellis goes even further than this. Neurosis for him arises out of "disordered emotion, the result of illogical, unrealistic, irrational, inflexible and childish thinking" (Ellis, 1958, p. 38).

The client is labelling behaviour and disturbing himself.

Self verbalizations have been and still are the prime source of emotional disturbance. Clients must be shown that their internalized sentences are illogical and unrealistic at certain critical points and that they have now the ability to control their emotions by telling themselves more rational and less self defeating sentences (Ellis, 1958, p. 39).

The job of the therapist is to bring these self-defeating sentences to the attention of the client, to show how they are causing disturbances, to demonstrate exactly what the illogical links in his internalized sentences are and, finally, to teach him how to rethink and reverbalize these sentences in a more logical and self helping way.

Ellis goes on to outline some of the main irrational ideas human beings are prone to follow and to suggest some substitute. It is the function of the therapist to mount a concerted attack on these "irrational" ideas. Chief among such ideas for Ellis is that:

Acts are wrong, wicked, or villainous
.... and should be punished.

In place of this the client should be taught:

Certain acts are inappropriate or anti-social ... people who perform such acts

invariably are stupid, ignorant or emotionally disturbed (Ellis, 1958, p. 40).

His whole therapeutic approach is a denial of almost everything Mowrer asserts. He is completely opposed to the whole point of view on sin and guilt.

Ellis represents a vocal and extreme viewpoint in opposition to Mowrer. But, in fact if not in clearly stated terms, he is far from being alone. His analysis of the cure of neurosis is that it is:

Stupid behaviour by a non-stupid person
(Ellis, July, 1958, p. 38).

Among other answers being suggested are the following:

Distortion caused by threat.

The individual is fixated at a particular stage in the need hierarchy.

The ego is unable to maintain a proper balance because the superego is too severe.

It is a function of conditionability, there are no underlying causes.

It is an unbalanced attention to stimulus.

The cures are consistent with the diagnosis. The question in the mind of the therapist will be:

How can I form a therapeutic relationship with this person?

What need has been unsatisfied?

How can I provide insight for the patient?

What are the client's symptoms?

What does the client attend to?

For others the way ahead is much more in terms of discovering and encouraging the right qualities required in a counsellor. The values of such things as transparency, spontaneity and warmth, tolerance, respect and accurate empathy are regarded as crucial if the counsellor is to communicate, and the client is to be able to share deeply. There is some evidence that the differences in healing and helping are more a function of these qualities than the theoretical orientation of the counsellor.

In spite of, even because of, this the question remains -- are we to ignore the issue of moral choice. Is Mowrer's question not highly relevant?

The issue of values has certainly come round in almost a full circle. Whatever kind of person we seek to become, or would wish others to become, the issue of values arises. To that degree it does not matter whether he is to be a "self actualizing person", a "mature personality", a "fully functioning person", a "normal personality", or a "reasonable adventurer".

Solomon argues that early findings are now encouraging in the search for universal values.

The results of the investigations which identify cross cultural commonalities in valuing lend credence to Roger's assertion (1964) that.... in persons relatively open in their experiencing there is an important commonality or universality of value directions; that these directions make for the constructive enhancement of the individual and his community and for the survival

and evolution of his species (Solomon, 1970, p. 301).

The relevance of values is strikingly, if inadvertantly illustrated by Ellis whose whole position is dominated by his commitment to a standard of right and wrong based on "long range or socialized hedonism" (Ellis, 1960, p. 189). There are many value assumptions in that creed.

Mowrer is focusing on what he believes happens when the individual wilfully and secretly goes against values and how the adverse results that follow from this can be reversed.

Solomon maintains that:

Behavioural scientists may be approaching the uncomfortable point in time when it will no longer be possible to be ethically neutral regarding deviation from the human values, the attainable traits, and the attainable social reality, which research illuminates (Solomon, 1970, p. 31).

It is Mowrer's contention that when behavioural scientists reach that point they will discover that man has been there as long as he has been a socialized person. In this writer's view man certainly needs a validated, usable system of values. Whether Mowrer's contract ethics provides this or side steps the issue rather than answering it can be argued, but at least he is recognizing the significance of the issue itself.

In effect, Mowrer has put Freud and his followers at one end of a continuum on guilt. He labels them as those who essentially deny the significance of anything other than

guilt feelings. He puts himself at the other end as affirming that real transgressions cause real guilt. All guilt is real guilt, it is caused by covering up transgressions. The others we have discussed are at different points and, like Freud and Mowrer, are inconsistent. Ellis, Fromm, Maslow, and Stein would be closest to Freud. In the center are people like Ausubel and Hiltner; between them and Mowrer are Meehl, Frankl and Belgum.

Mowrer rejects any attempt to integrate these positions. He discusses and rejects attempts of Jourard and Eysenck to do just that. Jourard maintains that there are some neurotic patients whose conscience is too severe and others who repress conscience in order to break "social taboos without conscious guilt" (Mowrer, 1961, pp. 223-6).

In the opinion of the writer, Jourard comes closer to the truth than Mowrer at this point. Guilt is complex and any "one shot" explanation hardly does justice to its nature and effects.

SOME APPROACHES TO THE TREATMENT OF GUILT

We have discussed Mowrer's insistence that the issue of moral choice and values is at the heart of guilt. But how can the concerned person help another individual at this point in their experience? In other words what treatment is needed or what is the therapeutic process that is appropriate?

Mowrer's answer is essentially simple. It consists of anything that anyone can do to help the person to make voluntary confession of their sins to significant others and to be involved in a life of willing commitment. He illustrates this with an account of a woman graduate student with severe psychosomatic difficulties. He encouraged her to honest conversation with her physician, close woman friend and husband. This cleared up her physical and emotional problems. There was a marked improvement in her relationship with her husband and family as well as in her marks. Her own assessment was:

All I needed was a little encouragement in doing what I could and should have done a long time ago, namely, start being honest, rather than hypocritical (Wolman, 1965, p. 261).

Brammer and Shostrom discuss "the therapeutic handling of guilt and conscience problems." They summarize what they believe to be the position of Rollo May. This emphasizes a non-judgmental attitude. It rejects the idea of watering down or neutralizing guilt. The emphasis is on helping the client face what he has done and take the responsibility for it. The purpose is to transform unaccepted and repressed guilt into the more normal or universal guilt. Normal guilt has nothing in common with Mowrer's ideas of real guilt. It is more the feelings of alienation that arise because of failing to achieve one's potential or helping others to achieve theirs, or the feelings of separation from Nature or God. When the client

reaches this type of guilt it is felt he will be able to handle it himself (Brammer, 1960, pp. 405-7).

Belgum develops a more extensive approach. He would enlist the whole church for the task. He emphasizes the danger of short cuts. There must be help given to enable the guilty person to make honest confession and to lead to real amendment of life. It is a gracious invitation from Christ to exchange pride for repentance, to forsake hypocrisy and practice confession and openness towards others, as well as, to expend energy in a constructive amendment of life. This will be stimulated by preaching, pastoral counselling and training the laity to encourage people to make these changes (Belgum, 1963).

Meehl adds his emphasis to these approaches. He distinguishes between the counsellor being non-judgmental and being permissive. He sees the counsellor as concerned to mediate "God's will", yet in a sense the counsellor will be permissive in that he will provide "in the warmth and strength of the counselling relationship" (Meehl, 1958, p. 276) the release that will allow the counsellor to make his own decisions. He will encourage confession and absolution, to God alone, to the pastor alone as well as to others. Meehl is insistent that the counsellor be aware that "uncovering the underlying dynamics is also important to effect a change in behaviour" (Meehl, 1958, p. 284).

Once again it is clear that Meehl is the more flexible and comprehensive in his approach. He can integrate the religious and the secular without doing violence to either and therefore minister to the whole man.

This brings us back once again to the relationship between the "secular" and the "religious".

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "THE SECULAR" AND

"THE RELIGIOUS" RAISED BY GUILT

Belgum maintains that guilt is the point where religion and psychology meet. But when they meet how do they relate? What do they have to say to each other? Mowrer has much to say. He accuses "evangelical religion" and the "pastoral counselling movement" of having "sold out" to the enemy. They have opted out of the whole care of emotional problems and referred the mentally ill to the Freudian.

However a close examination of the way his own thinking has progressed suggests that he has "bought out" Christianity himself. He defines all his terms in a "non-supernatural" manner. His definitions of sin, repentance, confession and restitution are all psychological, not Biblical. He appears to have come to the point where he would replace Christianity with "religion". He does not want it to be "Christo-centric" and he wishes it to be

"non-theistic" and "naturalistic". His position here is very similar to Jung, May and others.

This position that favours religion in general but rejects specific forms of it is understandable. From a Christian viewpoint it must be said that if history teaches us anything, it teaches us that when particular forms of Christianity have bought the argument they have ceased to exist and contributed nothing to man or God.

The view attributed to Freud that religion is an evil and destructive force has itself fallen on evil days. As pointed out by Turner and others, this is inadequate and the taboo on religion must be broken (Severin, 1965, pp. 306-8). It is an argument anyway that could with equal force be turned against the very people who make it. Are we to abandon psychology on the same ground? Is it to be treated differently?

Meehl has been most helpful in seeking to find a way through which there can be better mutual understanding and respect. Progress would be evident where psychology can begin to take man's spiritual strivings for what they are, where religious and/or Christian ideas on guilt, suffering and death will be heard, and where Christians will seek to understand human dynamics and relationship.

He says so very wisely and cautiously,

Nothing is gained by glossing over difficulties or tactfully avoiding mention of real differences. The widespread interest in the pastoral counselling movement, the numerous interdisciplinary conferences

which have been held between clergy and psychiatrists, the increasing number of pastors who seek such special training from the few sources available, indicate a rapidly growing rapprochement Some real difficulties have been repressed or, in other cases, have been reserved for the "hidden agenda". In the long run, as we all know, this kind of rapprochement cannot succeed. While the daily, practical co-operation of psychotherapists and pastors is improving, there is need for hard-headed, rigorous analysis of the conceptual relations involved (Meehl, 1958, pp. 302-2).

Gilbert Wren has suggested that a place to begin would be in the recognition that "religion and psychology complement each other". The former, he sees, as contributing to self understanding and "relationships with others". This would leave the function of religion to be that of understanding things like "meaning and purpose in life and the significance of these same relationships" (Severin, 1965, p. 378).

It is highly unlikely that either discipline will want or be able to keep within such limits. There is evidence that both are being forced to take the other seriously and listen more humbly and openly. Perhaps if each were to practise the values they believe universal, humanity might gain a greater dividend and each be enriched.

Belgium's belief that personal guilt is the place where they meet may not be comprehensive enough but, in this writer's view it appears to be accurate. Mowrer, at any rate, has been unable to deal with the issue without

involving both. He is certainly not alone. He has had considerable success in forcing both approaches to re-examine their own position in the light of the inadequacies he has established. Values, real guilt, moral responsibility, and religion are all live issues largely because of him.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

There are nevertheless some reservations that this writer feels must be pointed out. This is in spite of many points of agreement with Mowrer and appreciation of his viewpoint.

In the writer's opinion, unless the counselor took great care to establish a warm and non-judgmental relationship, the theoretical orientation of a follower of Mowrer would increase in some cases the anxiety of the person seeking help. The comments of Frankl, Meehl and Hiltner would bear this out. It would be construed by some persons as rejecting or hostile and for others confirm their worst fears about themselves.

In this writer's view Mowrer has not dealt sufficiently with the complexity of the issues of guilt and suffering. Do the guilty always have to suffer? Does the individual always pay for his sins? Some of the problems discussed in the Bible and theology down through the ages arise out of the observation that the guilty often

seem to get away with it. The Biblical viewpoint, in the writer's view, argues that there is no necessary relationship between suffering and sin as far as each individual is concerned. This whole area is not dealt with very satisfactorily by Mowrer.

A further objection is the level of consistency in his approach. Reference has been made to this earlier. It is unreasonable to expect that every loose end will be tied up. However, Mowrer makes bold and strong generalizations and then appears to retreat from them. Real transgressions are the cause of guilt. Depravities rather than deprivation is the enemy. Then he allows for exceptions in the case of chemical imbalance. He would also allow that maybe his original statement holds good in one half to one third of cases. These kinds of exceptions do not damage the position of those who allow for a variety of causes for guilt feelings, but this would appear to seriously damage Mowrer's major contention that the real cause of guilt feelings is real acts knowingly and secretly committed.

One other objection of this writer is that the whole approach of Mowrer would seem to encourage legalism in personal relationships rather than love. It is difficult to see how affection and concern for another's life and growth and willing self sacrifice would emerge out of contract ethics and a focus on repentance, confession and

restitution. We would seem to be back to the measuring offences and penalties and arguing about what constitutes a breach of contract. This seems to be travelling in the opposite direction to the 'third force' to which Mowrer claims to belong.

Nevertheless there are in Mowrer's basic contentions much that is very valuable. Quite clearly for Mowrer, real guilt is at the heart of personality disorder. Breakdowns occur as a result of a sequence of behaviour in which the individual has acted against his "conscience" The lack of punishment has created anxiety and leads to self punishment. Cure can only take place through confession, (publicity of sin and guilt) and restitution (compensating by new behaviour).

Neither the "cheap grace" of the church nor the "justification by insight" of the analyst will be of any avail. The solution is radical. The breakdown has occurred through a breach of relationships with significant others. It can be cured only by a restoration of those relationships. The individual is responsible for his own offence. He must be helped not to a further evasion of responsibility but to an acceptance of responsibility. He needs reality and integrity therapy. The nature of sin is radical, the necessity for redemption is equally so. To attempt therapeutic evasion will not only be unsuccessful, it will be countertherapeutic and will offer no assistance

to the individual to deal with the future. Easy forgiveness and the transference of guilt and private confession simply frustrate the healing and reconciling process.

There are obvious advantages to such an approach as Mowrer's. The cure will be quick and the individual will learn how not to get in trouble again. If he does he will know how to handle it. London is well aware that there is not yet sufficient evidence to validate Mowrer's approach. Yet he is prepared to state,

My own clinical experience with a variant of Mowrer's therapy suggests that this is an extremely promising position, holding hope for relatively rapid, very dramatic, and quite lasting cures of a variety of complex psychological problems (London, 1964, p. 141)

There are other advantages to following Mowrer. If his suggestions of the extensive use of "laymen" and the church taking over the mental hospital could be followed out, it could change the whole mental health situation. In addition the use of his socialization techniques could, if successful, reverse the general pattern of alienation in our society today. The gearing up of the church to have confidence in its competency and to demonstrate the reality of its faith by reaching out to troubled people could also significantly change our human situation. These things are not seen by him as a denial of the responsibility of the individual to accept his responsibility for his own deviant acts and to re-establish his own relationships. It hardly need be said that each of these "advantages" is

the subject of reservation and dispute.

A major cause for complaint is that he commits the very crime for which he convicts Freud. It is true that some of his followers defend Freud. It is also true that Mowrer is ambivalent. Nevertheless he seeks, by and large, to allow for no other type of guilt but one. In Freud's case it is guilt feelings not real guilt; in Mowrer real guilt not guilt feelings.

At best Mowrer's position here must be regarded as "not proven". It is rejected by the Bible itself. Members of the pastoral counselling movement feel it is not a sufficient explanation. It is rejected too by many non-Freudians. We have discussed, among others, Ausubel, Meehl and Belgum. Many of the neo-Freudians are beginning to make concessions in the direction Mowrer indicates. He has himself not attended to the serious as opposed to the personal attacks in "Comment" (American Psychologist, Vol. 15, 1961, pp. 712-5).

London's concluding comment on Mowrer is surely relevant.

Without a doubt, this is a thoroughly pretentious theory. But perhaps any theory that pretends to less than this risks denying man both cherished and valid parts of his humanity (London, 1964, p. 145).

Yet it is hardly possible to exaggerate the contribution he has made theoretically and practically to the subject of guilt. It has become the meeting ground not

only of religion and psychology but of learning theory and psychotherapy. London says:

His technical position attempts an integration of insight and action, of meaning and function in psychotherapy (London, 1964, p. 143).

He has indicated a depth and practicality to the Christian faith that could revitalize it. He has shown how the individual can be helped to exchange duplicity and moral failure for openness, honesty and a constructive contribution to life. He provides a means for dealing with the ravages of real guilt. He has stimulated vigorous debate and research on values, the central issue of our age.

In his dedication of "The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion" he states:

To Crystal Mowrer Smith and Gladys Durden Cook with gratitude for their faith in the ultimate unity of psychology and religion.

Whether or not he has brought that day nearer, he has forced each to take the other more seriously and to minister to the reality of guilt.

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A P P E N D I X

Strathcona Baptist Church,
8318 - 104th Street,
Edmonton, Alberta.

Rev. Roy D. Bell, B.D., Minister

October 24, 1969.

Professor Hobart Mowrer,
University of Illinois,
Urbana, Illinois, U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Mowrer:

I am interested in what you have written in the area of religion and psychiatry and have read a fair amount of your material. My interest is both a personal and a professional one. I am working on a Master's in Counselling at the University of Alberta, in addition to the responsibilities of a Baptist Church in a University centre.

I wondered if you would be kind enough to let me have a copy of an up-to-date list of your publications. You mentioned in the New Group Therapy a book called "Morality and Mental Health" and I wondered if it is now available and who is the publisher. I would also appreciate a copy of the directory "Their Brother's Keepers."

I wonder if you have also developed a more extensive way the relationship between learning theory and your diagnosis of the guilt problem.

Could I be right in drawing the conclusion that you would prefer preaching to revert to a stronger emphasis on moral standards going on to confession and restitution rather than the present style of inspiration.

It seems to me that you have taken a great many theological expressions from the Wrath of God to the Priesthood of all Believers, but reinterpreted them in psychological terms almost exclusively. Would you think that in preaching and teaching this is what the preacher himself should do? I certainly understand that we must express so called theological terms in human terms.

Another issue of importance to me is what are the correct moral standards? Are we back to absolutes? Who determines? If the community or significant others, how? If by consensus, what about racial issues?

I can understand your explanation of why children developed neurotic symptoms as a result of having neurotic parents. This is a learned thing. This would mean, I presume, that in dealing with products of such a situation one would not focus on guilt and restitution as much as on changing the pattern of their reaction to life. So counselling would be more than discovering guilt and planning restitution.

I have just read Jourard's book, "The Transparent Self," and wonder if an acknowledgement of guilt is part of transparency or the other way around.

These are questions that have occurred to me and I am sure you have not got any time to react to them. A bibliography list would be very satisfactory by itself.

I would like to express my personal thanks to you for the way in which you have wrestled with these issues and brought them to public attention. The reaction to your comments would indicate how alive the issue is underneath all the words we use.

I hope you will continue to keep well and continue to bring together these two vital disciplines.

With many thanks for taking up your time and for the possibility of obtaining a bibliography.

Yours sincerely,

Roy D. Bell

University of Illinois,
Department of Psychology,
Urbana, Illinois, U.S.A.

November 11, 1969

The Rev. Roy D. Bell,
Strathcona Baptist Church,
8318 - 104 Street,
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.

Dear Rev. Bell:

Let me try to respond to your letter of October 24 in roughly the order in which you raise various questions:

(1) The book, Morality and Mental Health, was published by the Rand McNally Company late in 1967. I'm sure your bookstore can obtain a copy of it for you or you can write directly to the publishers: Rand McNally and Company, P. O. Box 7600, Chicago, Illinois 60680. It's a big book and sells for something like \$9.00, as I recall. Unfortunately, the publisher does not have a price printed on the dust jacket of the book.

(2) Separately I am sending you a couple of papers in which I have touched at least briefly on the problem of guilt from the standpoint of learning theory. Also, I'd like to give you the name of a psychology professor in Peoria, Illinois, who has recently had a student do an excellent M.A. thesis in this area. His name is Professor Larry Reid, and his address is Department of Psychology, Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois 61601. The student's name is Robert Wilderman.

(3) You raise two very closely related questions, the one having to do with what might be called the "secularization" of the concept of guilt and the other having to do with the question of how one arrived at a "secular moral frame of reference." Separately I am sending you a paper entitled, "Conflict, Contract, Conscience, and Confession," in which I answer these two questions to the best of my ability.

(4) Your question drawn from Jourard's book, The Transparent Self, seems to involve a sort of chicken-and-egg problem: Does a person have to be transparent before he can acknowledge his guilt or does he become transparent only after he has done so? I don't know that I can answer

your question as formulated. We simply assume that people eventually get frightened and uncomfortable when they persist in undisclosed guilty secrets and finally decide to become transparent or truthful as a means of alleviating their misery.

(5) In keeping with your request I am sending you a bibliography of my writings, many of which will I suspect not be of much interest to you. But I'm sending two or three very recent papers which I think may be relevant to the problems with which you are currently wrestling. If you find time to read them, I'd be most interested in hearing your reactions.

Yours very cordially,

O. Hobart Mowrer
Research Professor of
Psychology

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